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The writing of this work took began during the 5th semester of my studies, on 
the MA in Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean Studies, at the International Hellenic 
University.  
This thesis deals with the history of the islands of Imbros and Tenedos and the 
stance of the Turkish foreign policy towards them. Both the islands were of great 
importance to Turkey and during the 20th century they experienced various difficult 
situations due to foreign policies and treaties. For my approach to be better 
understood, a general presentation of the ideological and historical background of the 
relations between Turkey and Greece will be given.  
In addition, this work will go through all the phases of the attitude of the 
various Turkish governments towards the Greek population of the islands of Imbros 
and Tenedos. Starting from 1920 and the Treaty of Sevres, moving on to 1923 and the 
Treaty of Lausanne, to 1960s and to 1974 when the situation deteriorated, after 
Turkey invaded Cyprus.  
Through the evolutionary course of the Greek population of the islands, we will 
reach some conclusions on how and why the foreign policy of the neighboring country 
reacted with specific ways. These ways led the indigenous Greek population of the 
islands to leave their native lands, as the exodus peaked.  
This study constitutes a small contribution to the many in-depth studies and 
researches that have been compiled from time to time by accredited scientists and 
historians. It is essentially a brief presentation of the blossoming Greek communities of 
both the islands and their structure and the way they were treated, which resulted to 
their dwindling. To this cause, it is vital to proceed with a theoretical approach on the 
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Preface 
The basis for this research originally stemmed from my passion for the history 
of the Greek communities in Turkey. As the years went by, the persecution of the 
Greek communities on behalf of the Turkish authorities generated violence which 
reached a higher level in the middle of the 1950s due to the conflict referring to the 
status of Cyprus. The ultimate goal of this work is to explore the multilayered mesh of 
the Greek – Turkish relations and go through the various ways that the Turkish foreign 
policy was expressed towards the Greek element, especially towards the Greeks of 
Imbros and Tenedos. What were the different phases of this policy? It is my passion to 
not only underline them, but to trace them and explain in depth how the Greek 
communities shrank and decimated.  
In truth, I could not have achieved my current level of success without a strong 
support group. First of all, my parents and brother, who supported me with love and 
understanding. And secondly, my committee members, each of whom has provided 
patient advice and guidance throughout the research process.  
I feel the need to thank all those who helped me and my effort in many ways, 
so as to conclude this thesis. I owe a warm “thank you” to the stuff of International 
Hellenic University’s Library who helped me find the necessary material to compile the 
basic axis of this study. I would also like to thank my supervisor, Prof. Spyridon Sfetas 
who urged me to take over this topic, for the directions he gave me and for his whole 
support. Moreover, I need to thank Prof. Stefanos Kordosis for his substantive 
observations which initiated further elaboration of particular themes and improved 
the final outcome. Thank you all for your unwavering support.  
As 2020 brought unprecedented circumstances for humanity in its total and 
global health was put in high risk, at this point I have to underline the difficulties I 
faced while I was compiling this dissertation during the Covid-19 Pandemic. There 
were several things I had in mind which, unfortunately, I had to exclude due to 
libraries, unions and other institutions being shut down for months as part of the 
lockdown measures, by governmental decision. I was devasted that I could not 
interview a few of the people who were actual residents of the islands of Imbros and 
Tenedos and experienced the events I am describing in my research but it was 
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impossible because they all belonged to vulnerable groups or aged above 70 years. The 
situation was really dangerous for their health, so the Imbros and Tenedos Union of 
Macedonia and Thrace had to cancel my set appointments. Despite this fact, I owe a 
huge “thank you” to all the people of the Union that I communicated with, for all their 
support and understanding. I hope that in the future we will have the chance to 
collaborate again with pleasure and warm feelings.  
i 
  -v- 
Contents 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................... III 
PREFACE .................................................................................................................IV 
CONTENTS ...............................................................................................................V 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1 
CHAPTER I: LEGAL STATUS OF THE CHRISTIAN ORTHODOX COMMUNITY IN THE 
OTTOMAN EMPIRE ................................................................................................... 3 
1.1 GREEK COMMUNITIES IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: THE ORTHODOX COMMUNITY OF 
IMBROS AND TENEDOS .............................................................................................. 3 
1.2 THE OTTOMAN MILLET SYSTEM ............................................................................ 5 
1.2.1 CHRISTIAN ORTHODOX AND THE FALL OF THE MILLET SYSTEM .................................. 7 
1.3. TANZIMAT REFORMS ......................................................................................... 8 
1.4 STATUS OF THE GREEK ORTHODOX COMMUNITIES.................................................. 10 
1.5 THE RISE OF THE TURKISH NATIONALISM ............................................................. 15 
1.6 PEACE CONVENTION OF ATHENS AND THE AFTERMATH .......................................... 15 
1.7 THE TREATY OF SEVRES ..................................................................................... 15 
1.7.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND .............................................................................. 15 
1.7.2 IMVROS AND TENEDOS IN THE TREATY OF SEVRES .............................................. 15 
CHAPTER II: FROM THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE TO THE TURKISH NATION - STATE ......... 19 
2.1 TURKISH WAR OF INDEPENDENCE ....................................................................... 20 
2.2 THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE ................................................................................ 21 
2.2.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND .............................................................................. 21 
2.2.2 IMVROS AND TENEDOS IN THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE.......................................... 24 
2.3 EVENTS BETWEEN 1923 AND 1930.................................................................... 26 
2.4 THE TURKISH CAPITAL TAX ................................................................................. 28 
2.5 EVENTS BETWEEN 1930 AND 1964.................................................................... 29 
2.6 TURKEY &WORLD WAR II ................................................................................. 31 
2.7 ERITME PROGRAMI........................................................................................... 33 
i 
  -vi- 
CHAPTER III: CYPRUS DISPUTE AND ITS INFLUENCE IN THE FOREIGN POLICY OF 
MODERN TURKEY ................................................................................................... 35 
3.1 TURKISH RETALIATION AGAINST IMBROS AND TENEDOS ........................................... 35 
3.1.1 DEMOGRAPHIC SHIFT ............................... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. 
3.2 TURKISH INVASION OF CYPRUS ..................... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. 
3.3 CYPRUS AFTER 1974 .................................. ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. 
3.4 THE AEGEAN CRISIS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES IN THE GREEK – TURKISH RELATIONS
 ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. 
3.5 GREECE, NATO AND THE US ........................ ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. 
3.6 EVENTS BETWEEN 1980 AND 1989.................................................................... 41 
3.7 THE ISSUE OF DEMILITARIZATION ........................................................................ 42 
3.7.1 IMIA: A MILITARY CRISIS ................................................................................ 43 
3.8 AEGEAN DISPUTE OVER THE YEARS ..................................................................... 44 
3.9 TURKISH OFFICIALS’ VIEWS ................................................................................ 46 
3.10 BIRTH OF HOPE FOR THE ISLANDS ..................................................................... 48 
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 51 




  -1- 
Introduction 
By looking back to the crucial historical events of the 19th and 20th century, we 
will obviously notice that, after the formation of the national states, minorities 
appeared and of course the need for their protection. There were, according to 
Democritus University of Thrace’s Professor Lena Divani, mainly three reasons for the 
national states to exist. 
1) The dissolution of the old empires and the “new” central power which was 
now in the hands of the local semi-autonomous governments. 
2) The dramatic changes in the international political spotlight due to the 
doctrine of Woodrow Wilson, -at that time- President of the United States of America, 
regarding peoples’ self-determination. After Wilson’s presidency, the United States 
returned to their self-isolation, making way for the British till the Second World War. 
3) New borders were created, leading to population transfers. Despite the fact 
that the transfers were systematic and well-organized, they left outside the newly 
created states minorities, both national and religious. As a result, it was urgent for the 
international community to come up with ways to protect them1. 
Here arises a reasonable question. Did minorities exist before all these events? 
Were there any minority issues at all? The answer to this is negative and it is easy to 
understand why. Someone has to just think of the loose structure of the empires and 
the multinational character they portrayed. 
The treaty of Lausanne in 1923 between Greece, the Ottoman Empire and the 
Allied French Republic, British Empire, Kingdom of Italy, Empire of Japan, and the 
Kingdom of Romania decided the future of both the populations that were exchanged 
between the two countries, and the populations that were left out of the exchange. 
The populations that were not part of the exchange became de jure minorities, by the 
determining criterion of their religious beliefs2. To this choice, the ottoman 
administrative structures and the “millet” institution paved the way, as they connected 
                                                 
1 Λένα Διβάνη, Ελλάδα Και Μειονότητες: Το Σύστημα Διεθνούς Προστασίας Της 
Κοινωνίας Των Εθνών (Αθήνα: Καστανιώτης, 2002), 25. 
2 Γεωργία Κλοκίδου, “Η Ελληνική Μειονότητα Στην Κωνσταντινούπολη Μετά Τη 
Συνθήκη Της Λωζάννης Και Μέχρι Το 1991” (Διπλωματική Μεταπτυχιακή Εργασία, 
Θεσσαλονίκη, Πανεπιστήμιο Μακεδονίας, 2014), 7. 
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national consciousness with religion. As a result of the use of a religious criterion, an 
institutional “other” entered the scene of the Greek nation - state. This criterion was 
also the link between the Muslims of Thrace and the Turkish state3.  
 Within the framework of the notion of a nation - state, the populations that 
were excluded from the exchange suffered the same confrontation. More specifically, 
the Muslim minority of Thrace was the institutional “other” inside Greek territory, 
likewise the Christian minorities of Istanbul, Imbros and Tenedos, were the 
institutional “other” inside Turkish territory. Various policies were addressing them, all 
of which were characterized by the principle of reciprocity and were fully affected by 
the crisis of the Greek – Turkish relations4.  
In this study, a brief presentation of the Greek minorities of Imbros and 
Tenedos is being attempted, starting from the Treaty of Sevres until 1991. We will try 
to get a full view of how the Greek minorities, as part of the general Christian 
minorities, were expressing themselves during various historic bends, namely the most 
important events that had to do with education, economy, social and political life. 
Alongside these, a big part of this study will address the role of the Turkish 
governments and its policies and the impact on the bilateral relations of Turkey and 
Greece and their history.     
 
        
                                                 
3 Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity. A Constructivist 
Approach, ed. Charles G. MacDonald, Studies in International Relations (New York: 
Routledge, 2003), 32-33. 
4 Renee Hirschon, ed., Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory 
Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey, vol. 12, 12 vols., Studies in Forced 
Migration (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003), 47. 
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Chapter I: Legal Status of the Christian Orthodox Community in the 
Ottoman Empire  
In this chapter, we are introduced to the Greek Minority. We will look closely to all the 
Greek communities in Turkey, and especially to those of Imbros and Tenedos. We will 
observe their features and structure and also the way they interacted with the Turkish 
population. The orthodox communities of both the islands will occupy a big part of the 
first chapter, as they are in the center of our interest.  
 
Moreover, as the last phase of the Ottoman Empire is being captured with sharpness, 
the well-known Peace Convention of Athens and mainly the treaty of Sevres are 
coming to influence the Greek – Turkish relations the most and also to have an impact 
of great importance towards them. In this chapter, we will also try to analyze what 
these official agreements provided for the Greek Orthodox population of the islands of 
Imbros and Tenedos.  
1.1 Greek Communities in the Ottoman Empire: The Orthodox Community of Imbros 
and Tenedos  
 
In order to underline the magnitude of the islands, one should probably begin 
with a little bit of geography so as to explain how Turkey apprehended them. Imbros is 
located northeast of the Aegean, between the islands of Lemnos, Samothrace and 
Agios Efstratios. Straight down the map, someone can spot Tenedos, which is much 
smaller regarding its size but closer to the Turkish coastline. The most distinctive 
characteristic of these islands is their proximity to the Straits of the Dardanelles. 
Imbros is located only eleven nautical miles from the mouth of the Dardanelles, and 
Tenedos twelve5. As their history has proved, their strategic position was not always in 
their favor. Franks, Turks, Slavs and people from other ethnic groups might have 
settled there for some specific periods of time but it was only the Greeks who resided 
the islands uninterruptedly. Especially Imbros was so closely connected to Athens that 
was also its municipality. The – so called – Thracian Sporades were appended to the 
Ottoman Empire in 1455 and were ruled by Kaptan Paşa, Grand Admiral of the navy. 
The age-old Greek communities of Anatolia counted thousands of Greeks who 
lived, worked and rendered exemplary service to their homeland6. After the prominent 
Greek community of Istanbul, the islands of Imbros and Tenedos concentrated a large 
number of Greek population who was Orthodox in its majority. As we already 
mentioned above, the Islands of Imbros and Tenedos gathered a large number of 
Greek Orthodox people who were for years residing and peacefully building their lives 
there. The islanders of Gökçeada (Imbros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos) have always been 
                                                 
5 Alexis Alexandris, “Imbros and Tenedos: A Study in Turkish Attitudes toward Two 
Ethnic Greek Island Communities since 1923,” Journal of The Hellenic Diaspora VII, 
no. 1 (1980), 6. 
6 Alexis Alexandris, The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek Turkish Relations 1918-
1974 (Athens: Center for Asia Minor Studies, 1983), 33. 
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hostages of difficulties that the relations between Turkey and Greece have faced and 
they have suffered a lot especially from 1964 through the 1980s, when the islands 
were almost emptied of their original inhabitants7. Both the Islands were 
overwhelmingly ethnically Greek and orthodox belief for them was of a very high 
value8. It was obvious, at that time, that orthodoxy was a bearer of Hellenism in a way, 
as the two notions were strongly connected. 
Numbers speak for themselves and underline the significance of the long-term 
Greek presence on the islands. The Imvriot population counted 9,456 inhabitants and 
was composed of 9,357 ethnic Greeks and only 99 Turks, whereas Bozcaada (Tenedos) 
had more of a balanced mix of 5,420 Greeks and 1,200 Turks, for a total of 6,620 
inhabitants9. Imbros counted about 10,000 residents, according to the 1927 census, 
the 3,967 of them were males and the other 4,094 were females, totaling 8,061. 186 of 
them were Turks who were working there as officers, 12 were Jews inhabiting with 
commercial goals, and the rest were Greeks. Whereas in Tenedos, the population 
according to the same census was 1,630 people, 622 of them being Turks, 964 Greeks, 
30 natives with foreign origin and 14 foreigner guests10.   
The people of Imbros were mostly farmers or shepherds, but there was also a 
small percentage of them that worked on commerce. The island’s fertile lands were 
suitable for agriculture. More than 3.600 acres of vineyards and 60.000 acres of 
planted arable fields led to large numbers of product exports11, which was remarkable 
for that particular period of time. Imbros was also a place appropriate for oil 
production, which explained the existence of about 68.000 olive trees that were 
cultivated on the island12.  
On the other hand, the people of Tenedos were working on vineyards and 
vinification, basing their wealth mostly on the production of wine. To a lower level, the 
35 acres of olive groves13 on Tenedos also offered some job opportunities. The level of 
life both in Imbros and in Tenedos was high in general, as the communities were 
blossoming throughout the years.  
                                                 
7 “Gökçeada (Imbros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos): Preserving the Bicultural Character of 
the Two Turkish Islands as a Model for Co-Operation between Turkey and Greece in 
the Interest of the People Concerned” (European Parliament Assembly, 2008). 
8 Νίκος Σηφουνάκης, Ίμβρος - Τένεδος, Οι Τελευταίες Ελληνικές Ημέρες (Αθήνα: 
Εκδόσεις Νέα Σύνορα - Λιβάνη, 1996), 37. 
9 “Gökçeada (Imbros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos): Preserving the Bicultural Character of 
the Two Turkish Islands as a Model for Co-Operation between Turkey and Greece in 
the Interest of the People Concerned.” 
10 Elcin Macar, “An Official Report Dated 1928 on Imbros and Tenedos” (Istanbul: 
Yildiz Technical University, n.d.), 2. 
11 Ανθή Γ. Λιμπιτσιούνη, “Το Πλέγμα Των Ελληνοτουρκικών Σχέσεων Και η Ελληνική 
Μειονότητα Στην Τουρκία, Οι Έλληνες Της Κωνσταντινούπολης, Της Ίμβρου Και Της 
Τενέδου, 1955-1964” (Διπλωματική Μεταπτυχιακή Εργασία, Θεσσαλονίκη, 
Αριστοτέλειο Πανεπιστήμιο Θεσσαλονίκης, 2008), 27. 
12 Macar, “An Official Report Dated 1928 on Imbros and Tenedos.”, 2.  
13 “Gökçeada (Imbros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos): Preserving the Bicultural Character of 
the Two Turkish Islands as a Model for Co-Operation between Turkey and Greece in 
the Interest of the People Concerned” (European Parliament Assembly, 2008), 15. 
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Social life on the islands was intense and a lot different than that of many 
towns. People, men and women, were going out, were having fun and returned back 
home to their families late. It is right to claim that most of the Greek people of the 
islands were religious and a bit conservative when it came to such issues. Imbros and 
Tenedos displayed an impressive percentage of well-educated Greeks. In total, literate 
Greeks were 3.200 males and 2,600 females, this translates into a huge 70% of the 
population in total. However, there were only ten people that could both read and 
write in Turkish in Imbros, while in Tenedos Greeks speaking Turkish were over 50% of 
the total population14. The approval to education was evident even regarding the 
young kids, who all attended school. There were good chances for them to continue 
with higher levels of education away, in places like Lemnos, Mitilene, or even Athens 
and become “experts” on their fields. 
“Security and order in the island were considered to be profound”15, as people 
were living their lives quietly without fears and corruption. Political tendencies in both 
islands were pretty much the same, driven by peoples’ pure will and beliefs. It is 
important to underline that it was difficult for the Greeks of the islands to shape a 
political view, as only the officers received newspapers and had the chance to hear the 
news first. The basis of the Greek communities of the islands of Imbros and Tenedos 
were the “Greek Hopes” of their people16. Although they were seemingly cut off of 
mainland Greece, judging by their location, they gathered people with talents and 
determination to push forward, create and lead.  
 
 
1.2 The Ottoman Millet System 
 
Before we dive deeper into the analysis of the status of the Greek Orthodox 
Communities, one should try and explain the complex Ottoman Millet System in order 
to better apprehend the way they were encountered on behalf of the Empire. The 
term “millet”, during the first centuries of the conquest, retains a different content 
from that which is later attributed to it and does not in any case express the existence 
of religious communities with central authority. At the top of these communities are 
the religious leaders of the individual dogmas and religions that are based throughout 
the empire17. 
To have a better understanding of the Ottoman Millet System, we have to take 
a look at its basic tenets first. As the Islamic Law commands, Jews and Christians were 
both accepted as people of the book. Islam does ensure the protection of non-Muslims 
via agreement between the State and the group. “In an Islamic State, non-Muslims are 
protected groups thus it is a duty of the government to protect their legitimate 
                                                 
14 Macar, “An Official Report Dated 1928 on Imbros and Tenedos.”, 3. 
15 Macar, 3. 
16 Λιμπιτσιούνη, “Το Πλέγμα Των Ελληνοτουρκικών Σχέσεων Και η Ελληνική 
Μειονότητα Στην Τουρκία, Οι Έλληνες Της Κωνσταντινούπολης, Της Ίμβρου Και Της 
Τενέδου, 1955-1964.”, 30. 
17 Κώστας Κωστής, “Κοινότητες, Εκκλησία Και Μιλλέτ Στις «Ελληνικές» Περιοχές 
Της Οθωμανικής Αυτοκρατορίας Κατά Την Περίοδο Των Μεταρρυθμίσεων,”, 60. 
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interests”18. The word “millet” is of arabic origin and can be translated to english with 
the word “nation”. In the beginning, millet was used to describe not only non-Muslims 
but any nation, while later historians kept using it to reffer to non-Muslim 
communities. Religion, language, community, ethnicity, and family made up the socio-
cultural fabric of the millet19. The Millet system was running in accordance with the 
Zimmi tradition that put in order public and personal rules for religious minorities who 
were residing in Islamic lands, following their rule. 
Non-Muslim minorities were able to govern themselves regarding religious 
matters and decide upon every single issue alone, with nearly no one stepping into 
their way. They also had the right to operate their own schools. The Ottoman Millet 
Sytem saw the other nations as united and collective bodies and gave them the 
opportunity to preserve their features inside their borders20. To sum up, the millet 
system established the coexistence of various religions and let them interact and 
communicate with harmony. It is vital to say that during the Ottoman Era, the basic 
human rights and values were at a great place and much appreciated by everyone21, 
while Qu’ran was giving the space to establish them legally.  
Usually, non-Muslims preferred to turn to education, literature and medicine, 
than to attend the army and offer military services. This handed them the appropriate 
supplies to reach high level administrative positions in Islamic states. Non-Muslims are 
also citizens of the Islamic country. This provided them with the right to work in almost 
every public job, just with the exception of those at the head of the State, the 
commander of the army and the governor or the judge because those jobs represent 
the sovereignty of the Islam22. No discrimination against the non-Muslims was made 
by the Muslims and this was maybe the most significant reason why the empire kept 
its strength for such a long time.  
After the Declaration of Tanzimat in 1839, the millet system changed 
drastically. The implementation of the new laws intended to the protection of life, 
security, law and decency. In the eyes of law, all citizens were faced equally while 
criminal law was further explored due to its complex nature. According to Fatih Öztürk 
and his article “The Ottoman Millet system”, this change was by a big percentage 
affected by the French Declaration of Human Rights23.  
The idea of getting into a more European friendly orbit was not right for the 
Ottomans, as we can see now, their system collapsed as it could not bear the 
differences being caused by the changes. A decree of 1856, secularised the empire by 
trying to reform the intricate - and perhaps a bit outdated - Ottoman millet system. 
With the 1876 Kanun-i Esasi, the nation of Islam became the nation of the Ottomans. 
 
                                                 
18 Efrat Aviv, “Millet System in the Ottoman Empire” (Oxford University Press, 
November 28, 2016), 13. 
19 Fatih Öztürk, “The Ottoman Millet System,” Güneydoğu Avrupa Araştırmaları 
Dergisi 16 (2009): 71–86. 
20  Fatih Öztürk, “The Ottoman Millet System,”: 71-86. 
21 Berdal Aral, “The Idea of Human Rights as Perceived in the Ottoman Empire,” 
Human Rights Quarterly 26, no. 2 (2004): 454–82. 
22 Öztürk, 71–86. 
23 Öztürk.  
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“All subjects of the Empire called Ottomans without distinction, whatever faith 
they profess; the status of an Ottoman is acquired and lost according to conditions 
specified by the law”24 
 
All the reforms made were aiming to one specific goal, the secularization of the 
republic. 19th century brought political shift and by the time of the establishment of 
the Republic of Turkey the notion of millet was totally erased and lost. In 1923, we 
have the early beginnings of a unified nationalist state, upon which we will elaborate 
more in the upcoming chapters. 
 
1.2.1 Christian Orthodox and the fall of the Millet System 
 
When following the motive of the Millet system, the Ottoman society became a 
harmonized mosaic of various cultures and different religions and provided peace and 
safety among the members of its society taking into consideration no distinction 
between Muslims and non-Muslims, race and color. Therefore, as the millet system 
started fading into the background and the need for a secular state became more and 
more obvious, this experience should have been taken into consideration in order to 
treat religious minorities right and help them find their natural place in the modem 
world. The constant need to see our own culture as superior to others should have 
been left out of the picture towards the peaceful view to not humiliate them, try to 
understand and not globalize them. Unfortunately, the Turkish State failed to follow 
that line.  
It was true that with the Tanzimat administrative reforms, the ecclesiastical 
factor was now imposed on the management of local and regional authority in a 
system which is in harmony with its conception at least25. This way all the particular 
characteristics of each region started fading and now administration was seen like the 
one of all the European states, at that time. Ecumenical Patriarchate of 
Constantinople’s political and religious power was in the plans to be absorbed by the 
new administrative structure of an empire that is reforming drastically.  
Prime Minister, Eleftherios Venizelos, and the Liberals wanted to enter World 
War I on the side of Entente and soon their attempts paid off. The 1918 Armistice of 
Mudros was beneficial for the Greek side. Greek Orthodox communities inside 
Ottoman territories welcomed the outcome because they believed that the Greek 
government had left them unassisted26. Ottoman empire was about to fall apart and it 
was obvious that the ground was fertile for the blossoming of the Greek nationalism 
                                                 
24 Kamel S. Abu Jaber, “The Millet System in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman 
Empire,” The Muslim World 57, no. 3 (July 1967): 212–23, 219. 
25 Κώστας Κωστής, “Κοινότητες, Εκκλησία Και Μιλλέτ Στις «Ελληνικές» Περιοχές 
Της Οθωμανικής Αυτοκρατορίας Κατά Την Περίοδο Των Μεταρρυθμίσεων,” Μνήμων 
13 (January 1, 1991): 57. 
26 Dimitris Kamouzis, “Elites and the Formation of National Identity. The Case of the 
Greek Orthodox Millet (Mid-Nineteenth Century to 1922),” in State-Nationalisms in the 
Ottoman Empire, Greece and Turkey. Orthodox and Muslims, 1830–1945., 
SOAS/Routledge Studies on the Middle East 17 (Routledge, 2013), 19. 
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inside the Greek minorities. In conclusion, when the Greek State failed to implement 
the Megali Idea policy, a new tendency was becoming very popular regarding a 
possible unification with mainland Greece. None of these trends was accomplished but 
their influence contributed the most in the consolidation of the Rum milleti as a Greek 
national group27.  
 
1.3 Tanzimat Reforms  
 
Tanzimat (in English: reorganization) indicates a series of reforms initiated by 
the Ottoman Empire from 1839 to 1876 under the reign of the sultans Abdülmecid I 
and Abdülaziz28. 19th century was characterized by various attempts of the Ottoman 
Empire to modernize its structure, strengthen its dominance and appeal to more of its 
subjects. İttihad-ı anasır was the basis of the reforms promoting unity among all the 
members of the population, but at the same time distinguishing Muslims from non-
Muslims.  
Scholars across the world support the division of Tanzimat reforms in two eras. 
Each era was run by a different elite, the first one extended from 1839 to 1954 
whereas the second from 1855 to 187129. The Edict of Gülhane (Hatt-ı Şerif) of 1839 
was the beginning of the reforms and gave the empire the opportunity to shape a new 
profile and reorganize its priorities. During the years of the second period, the High 
Porte was making its way through difficult paths characterized by instability. The 
Imperial Reform Edict (Islâhat Fermânı) came into frame in 1856 and non-Muslims 
were provided with more advantages than the Muslims. The Sultan pledged to act 
equally in front of all of his subjects regarding education, justice and government 
appointments.  
Another rather significant reform of this period was that of 1869, the Education 
Act, whose goal was to introduce a centralized and compulsory education system, 
similar to the French one30. This reform had an evident impact on the lives of all the 
communities that were living in Ottoman territories. This newly introduced education 
system aimed to offer cohesion to the empire by a state-centered ideology of 
Ottomanism. Unfortunately, the vast geographic expanse of the Ottoman Empire was 
not in favor of implementing the new plan. Demographic diversity as well as the 
existence of a high level schooling system were just some of the factors that made the 
Educational Act extremely difficult to be applied, especially on non-Muslim 
communities.  
Administration techniques like this were often counterproductive for the 
Ottoman governance. Various ethnonationalisms emerged in different parts of the 
                                                 
27 Kamouzis. 
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empire and proved that the imperial ideology of citizenship had decisively failed31. 
Western powers got frequently involved in the empire’s minority agenda and caused 
even more confusion. Under the sultan, who was the absolute leader, there was an 
ethnologically, linguistically and religiously varied set of communities which was quite 
difficult to be socio-politically governed. The Millet System offered that kind of 
structure and gave minorities the chance to evolve into semiautonomous 
populations32. Until the late 18th and 19th century no major problems were met but the 
situation changed when challenges appeared to shake the relationship between the 
Ottoman statecraft and the communities.  
The empire’s modern era prioritized the need for a closer administration that 
would integrate all communities and safeguard it from all enemies, both interior and 
exterior. The search for the right formula was not easy and lasted until the collapse of 
the empire in 1920s. Prominent ideologies like Ottomanism, Turkism and Islamism 
found support in leading figures, parties and governments since 183933. Out of the 
aforementioned three, Ottomanism was the most common one because it was not 
precocive. After 1839 the empire adopted characteristics of modern states of Western 
Europe in order to present a more up to date profile. To modernize themselves, the 
Ottomans understood that they had to give all of their subjects a new identification 
regardless of how staunch they were to the sultan. This new identity would aim to 
unite the ubiquitous subjects of the empire, without depriving them of their already 
existing unique characteristics. 
The notion of Ottoman subjects went beyond nationalities and ethnicities and 
came from historical Islamic experiences and the recognition of sultan as the leader, 
who rose through conquest and solidarity (asabiya). Here arises a reasonable question, 
was the Tanzimat able to piece together the notion of citizenship and the citizen in its 
Western sense with the notion of subjecthood derived from the concept of social 
solidarity?34 The answer is given through the process of the cultural shift that led to a 
legal – constitutional concept which defines an individual as a member of a 
multicultural community inhabiting a territory governed by an authority that 
designates both rights and obligations of individuals according to the formula of 
nationalism.  
In sum, decrees of the Tanzimat reforms were made public in 1839 and 1856, 
introducing the concept of equality of all communities regardless of their religious 
beliefs. Ottomans were in desperate need of social unity and economic and political 
stability and faced the reforms as the only way to pursue a neutral and non 
antagonistic policy35. Ottoman rulers backed a state funded schooling system in for the 
access to schools to be given to all young people, not only to those coming from the 
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elite. This pattern seemed to be strengthening the empire as it was the main educator, 
but also left enough space for governmental intervention in the pedagogical process. 
Education was the way to approach kids from a very young age, socialize them and 
direct them to loyalty towards state and other community members. Social unrest 
throughout the empire was controlled via education but even this tactic was not easy 
to follow.  
The new empire-wide identity was not shaped once and for all and as the 19th 
century was coming to an end, the structure of the empire seemed to have changed 
significantly. The focus was now on the Islamic identity of its majority Muslim 
population36. Even after turning to Islamism, the educational reforms achieved thanks 
to the Education Act of 1869 were not abandoned. State was now supporting a Muslim 
unity and adopted strategies towards that but the need of a centralized education 
system was still evident. The ability to interfere with how youth was being educated 
and socialized was of utmost importance and offered to the empire productive and 
devoted subjects.  
The liberal Tanzimat era associated notions of constitutionalism and by 1876 
the political shift was manifested by the ruling Ottoman elite. That was the year 
Abdülhamid II ascended to the throne and in spite of his promise to continue this new 
approach of governance, he soon revoked and did not give his consent to that 
direction37. The Young Turks movement followed by the replacement of Abdülhamid II 
reversed the situation again and constitutionalism was brought to the fore. Many of 
the reforms implemented during this period gave the future leaders of Turkey the 
intellectual and practical foundation to transform Turkey into a secular state and 
ultimately the state it is today. Kemal Attatürk might have been the leader responsible 
for the turn to secularization but Tanzimat’s central lines were decisive for years.  
 
 
1.4 Status of the Greek Orthodox Communities 
 
As this research is referring to two special cases of Greek Orthodox 
communities, first we have to present their general status in full. Our knowledge of 
how the Greek Orthodox Communities were treated by the Ottoman authorities from 
the period of the Tanzimat reforms onwards is poor. The relevant publications do not, 
in most cases, exceed the depth of just a short presentation as well as a basic analysis 
of community statutes, while no light is shed on the transformations that the 
structures of community administration went through, under pressure from the 
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Ottoman state in its attempt to strengthen central control over several of its 
provinces38. 
During the 19th century, we observe various administrative changes within the 
Ottoman state39. These changes can be seen as the result of some long and often 
contradictory choices as regards the political scene. Nevertheless, all the newly 
introduced ideas were integrated into the complex institutional grid of the empire and 
become legitimized by the Ottomans within their reform efforts, as we already 
mentioned above. When the Millet System came into view, much later than the 
conquest, possibly in the 18th and the 19th century, it left plenty of room for a revision 
of the traditional forms of political administration and social structure of the empire40. 
  All the orthodox populations of the Ottoman Empire presented the same 
feature, a strengthening of the administrative and political aspects of the church. In 
other words, religious and administrative functions of the orthodox communities were 
connected, almost tuck. For the Greek orthodox people of Imbros and Tenedos things 
were a bit more difficult than for the Greek orthodox of Istanbul41. The reason why this 
was the case is probably that the Patriarchate is based in the city of Istanbul, favoring 
its followers there. Istanbul was both the capital and the place where all decisions 
were made, the remote Aegean islands found it rarer and more time-consuming to 
“communicate” with the city or even to just be informed about what was happening in 
the empire.  
The 18th century brings an unprecedented disorganization for the mechanisms 
of the provincial administration which allows the Ottomans to start checking the 
enslaved orthodox population, under the influence of the Patriarchate, within the 
borders of the empire. The beginning of the 19th century, secular elements appear to 
have a foul control over community life, setting the Orthodox Church leaders and their 
followers aside42. Gradually, Greek Orthodox metropolitans reach a point at which 
they only have a symbolic possibility of intervention regarding the ratification of the 
decisions, whereas the kocabaşı (local Christian notables) were taking over.  
The class of the kocabaşı or proestoi was given an enviable financial and 
political support in the hopes of consolidating their rule and challenging the regulatory 
role of the Orthodox Church over secular affairs43. To what extent can this challenging 
effort expand? It is not easy to come to a conclusion with certainty when this refers to 
populations in which religion strongly directs daily practises and attitudes and the 
Greek Orthodox population of Imbros and Tenedos was such.  
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1.5 The Rise of Turkish Nationalism 
 
 
Nationalisms gained some worldwide legitimacy in 19th century by the time 
World War I put an end to all empires. Turkish nationalism belongs to this category of 
late-comer nationalisms. The supporters of the Ottoman reforms hoped for the 
preservation of the empire, so it was not possible to defend nationalism at the same 
time. When nationalism came into the limelight, the pursuit of Ottomanism was 
abandoned.  The Turkish nationalist idea acquired great influence over Ottoman 
politics in 1910s. The idea was backed by a lot of supporters and spread quickly, 
becoming one of the most prominent phenomena of the Young Turk era. Basic reasons 
for the implementation of what the Turkish nationalism defined were, first and 
foremost, the search for a national Turkish identity and secondly the construction of a 
social unity among Turks44.  
Ziya Gökalp, the distinguished writer and politician of Kurd origin, was a 
nationalist by choice. His realistic views over the matter encountered the ideology as 
necessary glue for a future cultural solidarity. He also underlined three important 
pillars as goals of the current: Türkiyacılık, Oğuzculuk and Turancılık. The term “Turk” 
had no positive significance till then, but this was not the case anymore. According to 
him, this new stream dismissed any remainder belief in Ottoman multinational 
coexistence and asserted that Asia Minor in whole was the Turkish home. Moreover, 
the ideology also supported Ziya Gökalp’s expansive vision of Turan, a region in Central 
Asia from which the Turkish peoples had originated from45.  
Turkish nationalism presumed that there would be a successful assimilation of 
all Turkish non-Muslims, more specifically of the Kurds, and defended the rights of all 
Turkish people inside the empire’s territories. It was true that the goals this current 
strived to achieve were very ambitious. The restoration of the empire and its even 
wider expansion could only be managed via war. Talaat Paşa, during his reign, showed 
that he was following the same path as his close friend, Ziya Gökalp. His beliefs pointed 
towards a Muslim supremacy and a rejection of a regionally rooted self-government. 
These two men were responsible of the cataclysmic disruption of the late Ottoman 
Middle East46. Post-Ottoman Turkey found its ancestor in the face of Talaat Paşa who 
promoted a radical nationalism but still embraced the power of political Islam.  
Yusuf Akçura, a bourgeois intellectual from a Kazan Tatar family47 emerged was 
another staunch advocate of Turkish nationalism. His kind of nationalism, also called as 
Pan-Turkism, emanated from his negative attitude towards Russian imperial 
domination. He encouraged all Turks to turn to their Turkish identity and shake off of 
them the multicultural Ottoman Empire. In an attempt to give the nationalist 
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movement a new perspective, he set up the Turkish Association (Türk Derneği) in 1908. 
This association was of utmost importance as it was the first nationalist organ that was 
established and included representatives both from inside and outside of the borders 
of the empire. There was a clear reflection of Akçura’s ideas about the unity of Turks 
on the association, as he tried to push them forward and make them trend all over the 
empire.  
The Turkish nationalist rhetoric was not acknowledging that in the land that 
eventually became Turkey, some non-Muslim populations preexisted. Events show 
that after Ottoman Empire’s debacle of the Balkan War of 1912, Greek villages of 
Anatolia experienced many attacks. A universal military service was in force since 1909 
and because of it Christians were also conscripted under some prejudicial 
circumstances48. At the beginning of the war, most of the Greek and Armenian 
conscripts were serving at labour camps and in many cases even dying there. 1915 
included the outset of the infamous events of ethnic cleansing and massacres against 
the Armenians of Anatolia that contributed in the death of more than one half of their 
total population49. It was the Greek army that occupied Anatolia after the war ended. 
Talaat Paşa along with Enver Paşa, the leaders of the Young Turks, were in 
charge of deciding how the Christian Orthodox population would be assimilated. This 
could be possible by violently Islamizing them, expelling them or exterminating them. 
Among the existing choices, the islamization was considered to be the best and more 
effective one. Every Muslim was now defined as a Turk in Asia Minor50. The Kurds were 
considered mountain Turks and allies in the struggle to exterminate all Christians. 
In other words, Turkish nationalism highlighted the idea of “Turkishness” and 
to that direction embraced diversity in an attempt to present the remaining population 
as homogenous51. Greeks, Armenians and Arabs were included in this problematic 
homogeneity in order to create a Turkish ethnicity. This gave birth to various virulent 
and hostile circumstances. To conclude, it seems that the nationalist idea remained 
somehow instrumental to the masses. It was more of a lesson that had to be taught as 




1.6 Peace Convention of Athens and the aftermath  
  
 
Before moving on to the 1920 Treaty of Sevres which, as this research will 
present, was nothing but a great defeat for the Ottoman Empire, there is a need to 
examine the Peace Convention of Athens (signed on the 13th of November 1913) as it 
was the only official agreement that regulated every issue concerning the Muslim 
regime of the new lands at that time. The first steps towards the agreement started in 
November 1913, when the Romanian Foreign Minister, Take Ionescu, attempted to 
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mediate between the two sides. He was a close friend and admirer of Eleftherios 
Venizelos whose intention was to take actions in order for the hostilities to end the 
soonest way possible. What he did was to warn the Porte that Romania would strike at 
any state which altered the provisions of the Treaty of Bucharest52, compelling Talaat 
Paşa to promise to conclude a treaty with Greece within the proximate future. 
After the end of the Balkan Wars, the Ottomans lost nearly all the European 
lands that were under their sovereignty. Eastern Thrace was the only piece of land 
they were able to recover53. The territories under Ottoman rule shrank considerably as 
the empire started watching its borders narrowing. This was recognized as a big loss 
and had an obvious impact. Greece could only rely on this convention to finally see the 
hostilities coming to an end, whereas the Ottoman Empire was forced to acknowledge 
Thessaloniki, the biggest part of Epirus (most importantly the city of Ioannina) and 
some Aegean islands (such as Crete) as Greek gains.  
The Convention’s aim was to consolidate peace and friendship between 
Ottomans and Greeks and restore their normal bilateral relations. Nonetheless, this 
was far from becoming a fact as the convention failed to find a solution to one of the 
most important issues, the future of Chios, Lemnos, Lesbos, Imbros and Tenedos – 
some major Aegean islands – which were gradually becoming an issue of European 
magnitude54. It was the Great Powers which once again interfered and tried to finalize 
the fate of the islands by awarding them to Greece with the exception of Imbros and 
Tenedos55. While the Turks were also enjoying diplomatic success with Austria-
Hungary, whose Foreign Minister maintained interest in Anatolian investments56, they 
could not accept their lost claims. After the Aegean dispute failed to be settled, various 
new conflicts were about to begin, stirring up both sides. 
During the first months of 1914, innumerable migrations were forced by the 
Turkish government. Those migrations referred to the Muslims of Serbia, Bulgaria and 
Greece who were sent to Asia Minor. These events, along with the fact that the 
Ottomans were ready to enter the First World War, were the actual pretext to the 
beginning of persecutions against the Greeks. When the Ecumenical Patriarchate 
declared the Orthodox Church under persecution, it immediately suspended operation 
of both churches and schools. Prosecution and deportation of the Greek element went 
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on during the following years - sometimes to a greater, sometimes to a lesser extent – 
until 191857.  
The reaction from the Greek side was fast, as the country’s diplomacy started 
taking actions towards negotiations for a voluntary population exchange between the 
Greek Orthodox population of Turkey and the Muslims of Greece. The first move to 
that direction seems to have taken place in Athens during a conversation that the 
Greek Prime Minister had with the Ottoman ambassador Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu in 
April 191458. The ambassador’s will was for the exchange to take place between the 
70.000 Greeks of Thrace and the Muslim population of Macedonia. Eleftherios 
Venizelos was ready to consent to that in order to prevent a possible violent eviction 
of the Greeks.  
Turkey tried to present this as a peaceful and mutual exchange of populations, 
although this was not their intention. Their purpose was to completely eradicate the 
Greek element inside their borders. They disagreed with the suggestion for a 
numerical balance of Greek and Turkish exchanges and also demanded the change of 
the citizenship of immigrants with their settlement in the foreign territory59. Another 
issue was the valuation of the property of immigrants and their compensation. Even 
regarding that, the Turkish side had reservations stating that the issue was the 
exchange of rural and not urban populations. It was clear for the Greek diplomats that 
from the beginning of the negotiations they faced the distrust of the other side. 
Despite every action attempted by the Prime Minister, Eleftherios Venizelos, and the 
Greeks, the population exchange never took place as Turkey entered World War I in 
October of the same year. The persecutions did not end60. 
Peace Convention of Athens ranks along with the Treaty of London and the 
Treaty of Bucharest, having as common feature the treatment of the affairs of the 




1.7 The Treaty of Sevres  
 
1.7.1 Historical Background 
 
The Treaty of Sevres, signed on 10 August 1920 at the French city Sèvres, 
marked the lowest point of the Ottoman Empire61. During the meeting of the Allied 
Supreme Council on the 22nd of April 1919, the Italian representative was absent, so 
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Greece was handed the chance and was given permission to occupy the wider area of 
Smyrna with the mission to maintain order and protect Christian populations, until a 
final peace agreement was reached. In reality, the Allies’ goal was - on one hand - to 
use the Greek army for the containment of the Turkish and – on the other – to limit 
the expansionist tensions of Italy.  
The operation for the military occupation of Smyrna took place on May 2, 1919. 
However, the outcome was negative as armed groups of Turks became involved, 
leading the incidents to bloodshed. In the town hall of Sèvres, the draft peace treaty 
was signed between the sultanate government of Istanbul and the allies of Entente. 
Greece was represented by Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos and the Greek 
ambassador to Paris, Athos Romanos62. 
Due to various disagreements between the Allies, the official Treaty of Sevres 
was signed two years after the Armistice of Mudros and more than a year after 
Versailles. The final document that was signed in Sevres was titled “Peace Treaty 
between the Allied and the Associated Powers and Turkey, signed at Sevres on 10 
August 1920”63. As regards the signatories of the Treaty, they were declared as 
follows: “On the one part […] the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan […] Armenia, 
Belgium, Greece, the Hedjaz, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State 
and Czechoslovakia; and Turkey of the other part”64. The final text is considered to be 
very long, having 433 articles in total, which are a lot more than those of the Treaty of 
Lausanne. This was a common tactic in order to tie down the weaker party. In total, 
the Treaty consists of thirteen parts, first of which being the Covenant of The League of 
Nations, as in the case of all the treaties ending World War I (only exception is the 
Treaty of Lausanne)65. 
The Treaty of Sevres, ratified by the Western Allies ensured the territorial 
annexations given to Greece in 1919. When Venizelos returned to Greece from Paris, 
he proudly declared to the Greek people that his policy had led to a Greece "of two 
continents and five seas"66. Until today, this official agreement is recognized as his 
greatest diplomatic success, as it created Greater Greece. Nevertheless, Greece's great 
achievement was about to lead to the worst national catastrophe.  
Even if the Ottoman Empire had reached the limits of its expansion, its basic 
structure - which was always based on the constant need to conquer new lands - was 
not stable anymore. When the expansionist policy came to a halt, the resettling of 
populations was not possible anymore and this resulted to unrest and continuous 
conflicts67. Also, regarding its economy, the Empire was not designed to “evolve into 
capitalism”68 and had no goals towards that. It was the Sultan’s will that left no space 
for other contenders or rivals. Judging by the outcome, it was not feasible for them to 
develop autonomously as well, especially in a world where the West could easily step 
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from capitalism, to imperialism. The decline was general as economy was not the only 
factor affected. The characteristics of the decline were also social, political and 
military.  
In other words, by the time the Treaty of Sevres was about to be enacted, it 
was Europe that was in control with its imperialist tensions becoming more and more 
intense. The existence of nation states was being consolidated despite the fact that 
imperialism left no free space for them to act. There were many cases of such nation-
states formerly being under the Ottoman control and now having to face their one-
time rulers in an antagonistic way69. The Ottoman Empire considered the upkeep of its 
frontiers the only way to find salvation. To this cause, the right management of the 
multinational and multireligious components of the empire was of utmost 
importance70.  
As a matter of fact, what really happened after the Treaty of Sevres was signed 
is that the empire was dismembered and Greece had big territorial benefits. This was 
generally seen as a painful loss for Turkey, a loss that was never accepted by them. All 
of the official agreements had to be ratified by the parliaments of the contracting 
states first and this never happened with the Treaty of Sevres. It was only Greece that 
ratified the de facto invalid treaty. Kemal and his Neo-Turks were never going to 
recognize the Sultan's signature on the Treaty of Sevres and his struggle, like that of 
many leading figures in the Turkish army, was for the Treaty not to be implemented71. 
In fact, it was the first struggle of the Turks with nationalist characteristics and not for 
the Ottoman Empire. Thus many generations of Turks were nurtured in the climate of 




1.7.2 Imbros and Tenedos in The Treaty of Sevres 
 
 
Article 84 of the Treaty of Sevres, adds more to the clear distinction of the 
European Frontier of the Ottoman territories. There is a very definite reference to the 
islands of Imbros and Tenedos here, according to which they are ceded to Greece. The 
exact sentence is: “Turkey further renounces in favor of Greece all her rights and title 
over the islands of Imbros and Tenedos”72. For a Treaty aiming to end World War I, the 
Treaty of Sevres gave the impression that its goal was to shove the Ottomans outside 
Europe73. The clauses of the text were pretty harsh which made it quite difficult for it 
to be enacted.  
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Gökçeada (Imbros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos) are also referred to in some more 
articles of the Treaty. Article 161, excludes both the islands –among others- from the 
Inter-Allied command. Furthermore, in Chapter VIII which composes the maintenance 
of the freedom of the Straits, article 178 forces the contracting parties to disarm and 
demolish the islands, as well as Lemnos, Samothrace and Mytilene. At the same time, 
this article gives Great Britain, France and Italy the authority to demolish roads and 
railways, as well as the ability to be the only ones that could construct them again74. 
The Treaty of Sevres referred just in general to religious, racial and lingual 
minorities, so it did not constitute a bilateral legal framework for Christian and 
Ottoman minorities. The text failed to provide the minorities with what they needed 
the most - at that time -, was not ratified and as a matter of fact did not contribute to 
the protection of the minorities.  
To conclude, between the years 1912 and 1923, the afflicted islands were in 
the center of the dispute between Greece and Turkey and their sovereignty faced 
many fluctuations. During the First World War, Imbros and Tenedos question was 
again drawn into the conflict, forcing their inhabitants face circumstances later seen as 
turning points in history75. The 1920 Treaty of Sevres might have ceded the islands and 
their sovereignty to Greece, it was, however, never ratified and officially recognized by 
Turkey. The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne constituted the last straw for the fate of the 
islands, as negotiations after the Turkish military successes in the so-called Anatolian 
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Chapter II: From the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Nation - State 
This next chapter will guide us through the formation of the Turkish Nation – State and 
will also constitute a historical examination of the institutionalization of Turkish 
nationhood. Even if the Turkish Republic has – until recently - been ignored in scholarly 
literature, scientists have been striving to analyze the republican era by questioning all 
the significant developments of the late Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, in this chapter, 
we are introduced to Turkish nationalism, an ideology inseparable to the configuration 
of their nation.  
 
Nineteenth-century reforms caused notable shift both in the ideological and 
the political life of the Ottomans. The reign of Abdülhamid II (1876 – 1909) indicated 
the abandonment of Ottomanism and an orientation towards a more conservative 
understanding of Islam76. At the dawn of the twentieth century, the empire was on 
increasingly unsafe ground. The reform attempts, to a large extent, had failed. 
Nationalist movements had spread widely and Ottomanism along with Young 
Ottomans seemed to have been left behind.  
The Young Turks, a movement of a heterogeneous basis, merged under the 
Committee of Union and Progress (CPU) and acquired political power in 1908. Their 
ultimate purpose was the preservation of the empire at all coasts, abiding by the rules 
of the sultanate and the caliphate. In the eyes of the Young Turks, the Ottoman Millet 
System was seen as a possible threat to the territorial unity and they were against any 
privileges provided by religious or ethnic criteria. The movement’s faint perception of 
Ottomanism was accompanied by other ideologies like Islamism or Turkism, all having 
as absolute goal the preservation of the empire77. After the end of the Balkan Wars, 
Ottomanism was increasingly relegated to the background while Turkist ideas came to 
the fore.  
The CPU encountered the Greek-Orthodox and the Armenians as enemies 
residing within the borders of the empire. After the Ottomans entered World War I, 
the CPU gained enough power to push Turkism forward and build its prospects around 
it. 1915 marked the year of the massacres and deportations of the Armenians. As 
almost the whole Armenian population was wiped out from ottoman territories, the 
genocide seemed to serve purposes of prevention of a complete collapse of the 
empire78.  
August 1920 brings the Sevres Treaty with the Allied Powers with clear 
intentions to divide the empire. The Treaty, as decomposed extensively above, was 
never put in action but had an effect on the blossoming of the already existing Anti-
Christian movement. Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, the emergence of the 
nationalist resistance movement was fast79. The Kemalist era brought secularism to 
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the fore and to this day it enriches the way in which the current leaders govern Turkey. 
The single party regime pushed forward the monopolization of political power and 
treated it as the only way to achieve coveted social and economic transformations.  
 
 
2.1 Turkish War of Independence  
 
 
Before we delve into the historical background of the Treaty of Lausanne and 
build a thorough analysis of what it determined for the islands, let us first elaborate on 
the facts of the Turkish War of Independence (Kurtuluş Savaşı) that took place 
between May 1919 and July 1923. There is a strong connection between these events 
and the signing of the Lausanne Treaty and it is important to discover it. This war 
belongs to a broader context, the so-called Eastern Question. The Ottoman Empire lost 
a big part of its lands during the 19th and the first quarter of the 20th century and was 
desperately trying to balance that.  
According to the Armistice of Mudros which ended the hostilities in Middle East 
in 1918, Ottoman lands had to be shared among the victorious sides, especially the 
lands inhabited by Turks. As a consequence, various resistance organizations were 
established in Thrace and Anatolia. Soon the resistance fronts were united in order to 
shape a movement towards independence under the guidance of Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk80. The celebrated Amasya Circular of June 22nd, 1919 is considered as the first 
written document starting the Turkish War of Independence. The four-year war in the 
hopes of national liberation had began manifested in the Erzurum and Sivas congress 
soon after.  
Entente occupied the city of Istanbul in March 1920 and then dissolved the 
Ottoman Parliament. Mustafa Kemal was named the President of the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly in April 192081. The newly established assembly was responsible for 
the strife in view of National Independence in the name of nation. Meanwhile, the 
ratification of the Treaty of Sevres led to harsh terms against the Turkish side. As we 
already mentioned, Ankara did not recognize the Treaty of Sevres and the unrest in 
Eastern Anatolia began. The Gümrü Agreement with Armenia was signed after the 
successful upshot of that struggle. Despite the fact that the aforementioned 
agreement somehow calmed the turmoil down, it was the Treaty of Moscow with 
Russia as well as the Kars Agreement with Azerbaijan and Georgia that put an end to 
the eastern front problem once and for all.  
The decision of the Big Four (France, Italy, Great Britain and the USA) was made 
and ordered Greeks troops to reach and occupy Izmir in May 1919 and having the city 
as a base, tried to spread to the Aegean. They were soon pushed back after being 
defeated in some notable battles. Last but not least, the French Powers also fell back 
due to another agreement, that of Ankara. Everything was then in line for an organized 
attack in the western front. Izmir got liberated in September 1922. This period was 
described as really positive for the Turks, as the military successes followed one 
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another. These successes highlighted the need and paved the way for the 
establishment of the Turkish Republic.  
The Armistice of Mudanya on the 11th of October 1922 brought the Entente 
and Ankara to concord. All Powers agreed upon another conference that would be 
later held in Lausanne aiming to elaborate more on a probable Peace Treaty. The Allied 
Powers invited the Turkish government to Istanbul so as for the negotiations to start82. 
That was the exact point when the sultanate was abolished. The caliphate was 
separated from the sultanate thanks to the Turkish Grand National Assembly. 
Eventually, Mehmed VI Vahiddedin was the last Ottoman sultan. He was forced to 
abandon Istanbul on the 17th of November 1922. The Turkish War of Independence 
was ended by the Mudanya Armistice and the Lausanne Peace Treaty, both of which 
freed Istanbul and eastern Thrace from foreign occupation and strengthened 
international recognition of Turkish independence83. 
Negotiations about the Lausanne Treaty began on November 21st, 1922. The 
way to reach a final agreement was not easy as the parley was suspended in February 
1923 due to dissension regarding the capitulations. However, in April the discussion 
resumed and everything was in line to finally have a result.  
 
2.2 The Treaty of Lausanne 
2.2.1 Historical Background 
 
Lord Curzon, president of the territorial and military commission of the 
Lausanne conference, was aiming at a peace treaty between Greece and Turkey. That 
peace treaty would have led Turkey to lose power and take a distance from Soviet 
Russia. The ultimate goal was the stabilization of Middle East and its territories84. A 
population exchange between Greece and Turkey and the appropriate support of 
minorities that would be excluded were much needed and guaranteed the safety of 
the region. This was the time when the negotiations for the final peace treaty started. 
The Treaty of Lausanne was finally signed on the 24th of July 1923. The Turkish 
stance towards minorities was perfectly expressed by the leader of the Turkish 
feminist movement, Halide Edip Adivar. She sent an epistle to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
during the Turkish War of Independence in which she stated “Whatever the conditions 
are, the Christian minorities will remain. They will enjoy the same privileges as the 
Ottoman citizens, and they will be based on foreign powers - on some European powers 
- to always be the cause of problems. This will provide the place for foreigners to be in 
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touch with us and - as time passes - we will lose a part of our independence, in favor of 
those minorities”85. 
July 1923, found Turkey celebrating as the country saw the historical document 
as a huge victory that gave them both the ability to not have capitulations anymore, 
and negotiate together with the winners of the World War I. In Greece, the treaty did 
not have an equally warm welcome, as we can observe with a quick look at the press 
of that time. The road from Sevres to Lausanne was proved to be painful due to the 
national split of Greeks and the absence of the Greece’s former allies86. If Greece faced 
some more favorable conditions, the state owes it to the revolution of the Greek army 
in 1922 and to Eleftherios Venizelos who aimed at peace and tried to display Greece’s 
peaceful work.    
The Treaty showed implications with not only political-diplomatic character, 
but also with a human one. On the 30th of January, both sides signed the bilateral 
Convention for the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations. This marked the first 
time a population exchange was imposed, in the history of International Law with 
religion being the only criterion. Given that this was the case, the exclusion of the 
Orthodox inhabitants of the islands of Imbros and Tenedos was specified in the Treaty, 
as they were the conditions for the protection of the remaining minorities87. According 
to the Lausanne Peace Treaty, two islands at the mouth of the Dardanelles – Gökçeada 
(Imbros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos) - were ceded to Turkey for security reasons88. In 
article 14, paragraph 2, we find a clause that makes it clear. About 9,000 Rums 
(according to a 1920 census) living in those two islands that are excluded from the 
exchange.  
These were not the only minority groups left out of the new reality that the 
Treaty imposed. Except for Imbros and Tenedos, Greeks of Thrace and Istanbul were 
also excluded. On the other hand, the Lausanne Treaty reaffirmed that these 
minorities would be free regarding their religion, their language and their education. 
They were allowed to manage their vakifs, follow their customs and act according to 
their law89. At first, these might seem as obvious advantages for the minorities and 
their people, but this was not the case. In reality, the Peace Treaty of Lausanne had 
enormous flaws which were to be found out later on.  
From November 1912 to September 1923, the Aegean islands of Imbros and 
Tenedos remained under Greek governance but the legal status was open. Along with 
the rest of the islands of the Aegean Sea, they counted vast Greek majorities. It is true 
that, in the case of Imbros, almost the entire population was of Greek origin. Because 
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of Turkish strategic concerns voiced at Lausanne, the islands were handed over to 
Turkey in the wider terms of reference of the Lausanne Treaty. In it the Turkish 
government was required “to implement a regime of local self-administration for the 
Imbriots and Tenediots”90. Turkey opposed to Article 14 of the Treaty, as the state did 
not agree with its provisions. Despite this fact, the Greek islanders managed to 
preserve their local Aegean ethno-religious character until 197091.  
Between 1951 and 1965 they succeeded in maintaining eight Orthodox 
churches and ten Greek-language schools. The much smaller island of Tenedos also 
had a majority of Greeks inhabiting on its lands. From 1926, a high-ranking bishop 
representing the Greek Orthodox of both the islands has been joining the Holy Synod 
of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, while from the 1950s onwards some prominent figures 
of the society of Imbriots went on to join the Phanar ecclesiastical hierarchy and also 
achieve the highest possible positions in the Greek Orthodox Church. Some of the 
brightest examples of these prominent figures are the dignitary of the Ecumenical 
Throne, Patriarch Bartholomeos I, and former Archbishop of America Iakovos who are 
natives of Imbros92. 
Between the late 1960s and the early 1970s, the situations started 
deteriorating. The administrators of the territories put in action some legal and 
administrative restrictions for education93 and cultural matters of the minority. On top 
of that, an exhausting plan of expropriations was put in action and resulted in the 
making of a crucial decision for the local Imbriot and Tenediot Greek Orthodox. They 
left their lives, properties and lands in huge numbers to seek refuge in Greece, 
Western Europe, the United States and Australia94. In 1970, Imbros was renamed 
officially as Gökçeada to follow the drastic demographic changes being made. 
Interestingly enough, the Turkish side decided to built the first Turkish mosque in the 
islands in 1965 on a place formerly inhabited by Greeks, as it was an expropriated 
Greek Orthodox vakif in Panagia, the capital of Imbros95. Today there are about 10,000 
residents in Gökçeada, of whom only the disappointingly low number of 300 are 
Greeks, the rest being Anatolian migrants brought in after 1964. Even sadder are the 
numbers regarding the Greek presence in Tenedos / Bozcaada, where the greek 
element almost disappeared with only a handful of the native Greek Orthodox 
remaining96. 
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 Until today, the Lausanne Treaty is still in force and is seen as a turning point 
for Greek – Turkish minority issues. To a large extent, the treaty failed to ensure one of 
its most valuable provisions, the safety of the minorities. The Greek Orthodox minority 
of Turkey almost ceased to exist. Main reason to that is the principle of reciprocity 
which governs the two minorities. Even if the numbers implied that the Greek 
Orthodox and the Turkish Islamic minorities were close, the features of the 
communities are not symmetrical at all. Greek Orthodox were well-educated and had a 
high-level lifestyle, in contrast with the Islamic minority which was mostly rural and 
appreciated the Ottoman backwardness that had inherited. Lausanne Peace Treaty’s 
various omissions, failed to promote the interests of the minorities. It is for these 
reasons that the Lausanne bilateral approach to minority issues appears to be receding 









Article 12 marks the first article of the Treaty of Lausanne to have a clear 
reference to Imbros and Tenedos. This article is strongly connected to two previous 
official documents, those of the Treaty of London and the Convention of Athens. It is 
stated that “… the sovereignty of Greece over the islands of the Eastern Mediterranean, 
other than the islands of Imbros, Tenedos and Rabbit Islands, particularly the islands of 
Lemnos, Samothrace, Mytilene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria, is confirmed…”98. Having 
stipulated that, article 12 concludes with a - contradictory to the aforementioned – 
clarification: “… the islands situated at less than three miles from the Asiatic coast 
remain under Turkish sovereignty”99. 
With the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne, the territories of the islands 
that this research is about were not in Greek hands anymore, albeit article 14 of the 
Treaty stipulates a strong regime of local autonomy in favor of the traditional 
inhabitants of Imbros and Tenedos: 
“The islands of Imbros and Tenedos, remaining under Turkish sovereignty, shall 
enjoy a special administrative organization composed of local elements and furnishing 
every guarantee for the native non-Moslem population in so far as concerns local 
administration and the protection of person and property. The maintenance of order 
will be assured therein by a police force recruited from amongst the local population by 
the local administration above provided for and placed under its orders.  
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The agreements which have been, or maybe, concluded between Greece and 
Turkey relating to the exchange of the Greek and Turkish populations will not be 
applied to the inhabitants of the islands of Imbros and Tenedos”100. 
In article 37 of the Treaty, which opens the third section and refers to 
minorities, we have the confirmation that Turkey is obliged not to oppose to any laws, 
regulations or official actions that secure articles 38 to 44. The following article 
reassures that the Turkish government is committed to protect life and liberty of all 
those inhabiting Turkey, regardless of their birth, nationality, language, race or 
religion. The article continues as follows: “Non-Moslem minorities will enjoy full 
freedom of movement and of emigration, subject to the measures applied, on the 
whole or on part of the territory, to all Turkish nationals, and which may be taken by 
the Turkish Government for national defence, or for the maintenance of public 
order”101. 
Article 39 is the last one that aims to arrange the minorities’ question as it 
begins with a distinct obligation of the Turkish side to treat all Turkish nationals 
belonging to non-Muslim minorities equally to the Muslim ones, as regards civil and 
political rights, as well as law. Job opportunities shall not differ between Muslims and 
non Muslims, while no language restrictions exist for those not speaking Turkish. In 
fact, along with the use of the official Turkish language, the Treaty of Lausanne grants 
the Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech with the ability to orally use their mother 
language in courts.  
In short, the Greek side was financially inferior to the Turkish one and for that 
reason was forced to pay in kind the war reparations. Repayment was made by 
extending the Turkish territories of Eastern Thrace beyond the limits of the agreement. 
The islands of Imbros and Tenedos were ceded to Turkey on the condition that they 
would be ruled on favorable terms for the Greeks. Also, the Dodecanese was now 
officially awarded to Italy, as provided for in the Treaty of Sevres. The Ecumenical 
Patriarch lost his status as Ethnarch and the Patriarchate was placed under a special 
international legal status102. Since the Treaty of Sevres mentioned religious, racial and 
linguistic minorities poorly and in general, the only legal bilateral framework left for 
the Christian and Muslim communities was the Treaty of Lausanne. The characteristic 
of self-government that was formerly attributed to the islands was now - more 
blatantly than ever - circumvented.  
In return, Turkey relinquished all claims to the old territories of the Ottoman 
Empire outside its borders and guaranteed the rights of minorities inside Turkey. In 
addition to the above, a separate agreement laid the foundation for an obligatory 
exchange of minorities between Turkey and Greece along with the demilitarization of 
some Aegean islands103. All those inhabiting the prefecture of Istanbul the Princes' 
Islands and the surrounding area (around 125,000 people residing there before the 
date of the 30th of October 1918) together with the inhabitants of Imbros, Tenedos 
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and the Muslims of Thrace (around 110,000 people) were excluded from the 
exchange104. 
The actual outcome was seen as an abolishment of the Treaty of Sevres, which 
had not been accepted by the new Turkish government that succeeded the Sultan of 
Constantinople and provided, among other things, for the concession of Imbros and 
Tenedos and eastern Thrace. Smyrna, according to the first Treaty, belonged to Turkey 
but was ruled by a Greek commissioner. The most important element of the 
agreement was the exchange of populations105. Even if this was a justifiable course of 
events, it resulted in two more issues: the minority and the refugee one. Whether it 
constitutes "victory" or "loss" for both nations is a matter of perennial and 
multifaceted controversy. 
  
2.3 Events between 1923 and 1930 
 
Between 1915 and 1923, the Christians living in Turkey had almost 
disappeared. By deliberately trying to erase from their memory the deaths of the 
Greeks and the population exchange, the republicans fabricated a new version of the 
history which propelled nationalism106. Cultural unity was to be ensured by the 
nationalist rhetoric but the gap between the elite that produced this ideology and its 
possible habitues was too big to be bridged.  
From March 1923, the Greeks of Imbros and Tenedos had already been 
informed about the concession to Turkey via a telegram from Eleftherios Venizelos. 
The islanders did not warmly welcome the news and till the last moment tried to 
overthrow the unpleasant situation. In October 1923, both the islands were officially 
ceded to Turkey. Greek Prime Minister, Nikolaos Plastiras, hurried to reassure Imbriots 
and Tenediots that they would be given enough time to act and complete all of their 
affairs. At the same time, there were tendencies to flee from the islands to the rest of 
Greece107. More than 1,500 islanders fled the islands before the arrival of the Turkish 
officials, some of them being school teachers, doctors and lawyers. Despite them 
wanting to return home, the Turkish side turned their petitions down by making the 
procedures really obscure. By disallowing the return of the residents of Imbros and 
Tenedos, Turkey was in fact violating the Declaration of Amnesty signed at Lausanne. 
Turks invaded and occupied Tenedos on the 21st of September 1923, before the 
Treaty of Lausanne was formally ratified. On the 4th of October of the same year, it was 
Imbros’ turn. Turkish authorities reached the island and forced the last administrator 
of Imbros, Ioannis Paputsidakis, to sign the delivery protocol. Hüseyin Kazım Kadri, 
inspector of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, took over Imbros in a blatant violation of 
the Lausanne Treaty. According to article 14 of the agreement, representatives of the 
non-Muslim indigenous population were to undertake the island. Justice, police, 
customs and ports were now in Turkish hands, giving the privilege to manage them 
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according to their will108. The administrative council of the islands (Adalar Mahalli İdare 
Meclisi) was made of four islanders popularly elected by the local population before 
1912109. The coming of the Turkish officials changed the balance and eliminated 
equality and equity.  
Ten schools were operating in Imbros before 1923, having a total of 1,485 
students, whereas in Tenedos the two greek schools had a total of 450 students110. The 
famous Adalar Kanunu (Law of the Islands) that forced students of Greek origin to be 
educated in Turkish was temporarily suspended in 1951111, only to come back harsher 
after 1960. Even the school registers were written in Turkish. On the 20th of February, 
the Central Greek School of Imbros was shut down, due to claims that it was operating 
as a college and for that particular reason it had to appoint teachers recommended by 
Ankara112. 
Most of the information about the conditions in Imbros and Tenedos were 
collected from the narratives of the inhabitants themselves and, for this reason, they 
were usually characterized as exaggerating. From 1922 to 1927, the British Liaison 
officer in the Aegean, Nottingham Palmer, constituted the most reliable source, as he 
was residing there for years and knew every detail. From 1924 until today, no 
indigenous Imbriot or Tenediot managed to take control of the administration of the 
islands.  
Ankara Accord of June 21, 1925 and Athens Accord of December 1, 1926 
included great efforts for the settlement of the Imbros and Tenedos question. In 
general, the attempts failed but both the agreements brought the two sides closer 
than ever in order to reach a common ground113. The well-known Ankara Convention 
signed by Greece and Turkey in 1930 beared absolutely no reference of the islands. 
The population exchange that was about to take place during the years 1922-1930 
draw the attention of each side the most and the Greco-Turkish negotiations were not 
concluded. By the end of 1929, the bilateral relations of the two sides reached their 
lowest point to date.  
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2.4 The Turkish Capital Tax 
 
“While article 14 was debated, the chairman of the commission said: ‘It is fair to 
exclude the brother’s property as well, otherwise it would be contradictory to the 
Principles of Law’. 
I could not hold myself from jesting: ‘For God’s sake Prime Minister! Which of the 
articles of this law is compatible with the Principles of Law’... Saracoğlu laughed: 
‘Minister of Economics, are you listening? 
Look what they are saying about your bill’ he said and, among laughter coming from all 
sides [of the Assembly] the debate on this article and the entire bill came to an end. ”114 
 
Varlık Vergisi, the Turkish Capital Tax, was a painfully punitive tax imposed to 
the properties of Greek, Jewish and Armenian citizens of Turkey. Prime Minister, Şükrü 
Saracoğlu, and İsmet İnönü introduced the idea of taxation at a time when Turkey was 
in desperate need of revenue to finance the fivefold increase in government 
expenditure, mostly on defense, caused by the outbreak of war in Europe115. In 
addition to that, Germans seemed to be winning the war in 1942, so it was the right 
time for the Turkish authorities to adopt Nazi methods in order to cripple the 
minorities.  
It is a fact that the tax was imposed to all Turkish citizens, but those of non-
Muslim origin had to pay from five to even ten times more. This brought the non-
Muslim population of the empire to its limits, by sometimes forcing them to pay more 
than the actual worth of their personal property. Besides that, those unable to pay off 
the wealth tax not only saw their belongings confiscated by the authorities, but also 
auctioned at rather degrading prices116. Men that were not able to settle up their 
debts on time, were deported to Aşkale (a town of the Erzurum province) to repay by 
working under extremely difficult circumstances. Out of 2,057 people sent to Aşkale, 
21 died there. The outcome of the war was obvious in March 1944, when the Allies 
were clearly winning. It was about time for the Capital Tax to be abrogated and for the 
deportees to be allowed to return home. Except for the people’s confiscated 
properties, Orthodox monasteries had no control over their belongings any more. The 
clergy had no other choice but to grant the empire with all its wealth, later to be given 
to the settlers.  
The Varlık Vergisi problem was deeper than it seems. The implementation of an 
unjust and disproportionate Capital Tax Law had short, as well as long term impact on 
the Turkish economy117. The need for turcification of every aspect of the economic life 
emerged again, stronger than ever, and attested Nazi influence regarding the 
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measures taken towards the minorities. Prominent scholars, such as Taner Timur and  
Çetin Yetkin, describe the character of the tax as racist (ırçkı), as it undermined the 
existence of specific population groups. The decades following the end of World War II 
brought political initiatives and legal measures that almost completely wrecked both 
the economic influence and the presence of minorities118. The Constantinopolitan 
Greek minority, along with the Imbriot and Tenediot one, were affected the most.  
  
2.5 Events between 1930 and 1964 
 
The turbulent conditions of the 1920s incommodated the Greek Orthodox 
islanders and changed their lives once and for all119. Despite the harsh treatment of 
the Turkish side, Imbriots and Tenediots did not give up and through agriculture 
strived to financially secure their families. From 1930 onwards, the Greco-Turkish 
negotiations entered a more peaceful era, as small steps towards a solution were 
made. In August 1931, the Turkish minister of interior reached the islands for the 
purposes of finally putting in action Article 14 of the Lausanne Treaty120. Imbros and 
Tenedos were demilitarized then, and trade with the mainland was slowly being 
restored. The rapprochement of Athens and Ankara during these years somehow 
erased thoughts about a possible attack of the Greeks against the straits. The 
Montreux Convention of July 20, 1936 satisfied the Turkish government and the straits 
were now under Turkish sovereignty121. Greece was showing generate flexibility and as 
an answer to that, a local Greek mayor (δήμαρχος) along with seven village elders 
(δημογέροντες) were allowed to be popularly elected.  
As late as the end of the Second World War, the islands enjoyed a rather quiet 
period. The following years included the preparations of both Greece and Turkey to 
join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)122 in 1952.  A huge improvement 
was the change of the educational system starting from the academic year 1952-1953. 
School students of Imbros and Tenedos were permitted to take classes of Greek 
language, as it was included in the lessons of the curriculum123. Archbishop Meliton’s 
fourteen-year incumbency did not only develop education on the islands, but also 
medical care. He managed to collect enough money to build a hospital in Imbros. 
President of the Turkish Republic, Celal Bayar visited Imbros in 1951 paving the way for 
a relaxation of the restrictions regarding travelling to the islands after a twenty- seven-
year long period.  
Thirty years after the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne, the two countries 
signed the Balkan Pact alongside the Yugoslav Government. Main characteristic of this 
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period was the very good relations between Greece and Turkey that lasted till 1955124. 
People of the islands shaped agricultural associations to further strengthen their 
professional activities and Greek educational centers to promote Greek culture and 
language. A Greek newspaper exclusively for the inhabitants of the islands of Imbros 
and Tenedos (Η φωνή της Ίμβρου) began to be printed in Constantinople and 
dispatched to the islands125. 1955 is the year that Cyprus dispute appears in the picture 
to bring the bilateral relations in shaky ground and completely reverse the situation. 
The Mediterranean island of Cyprus was under British rule from 1878, with a 
very large greek community, over eighty percent of the total population. Despite the 
fact that the Greeks of Cyprus were already asking for a union with Greece, Britain 
annexed the island in 1914 and declared it a crown colony in 1925126. April 1, 1955 was 
the starting point for the unrest aiming to aiming to end that conditions and finally 
boost the need for unity with Greece. EOKA (Εθνική Οργάνωσις Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών) 
was the Greek Cypriot nationalist guerilla organization in charge of the campaign for 
the end of the British rule. Turkish Cypriots faced the tension as a possible start of a 
civil war. When the British authorities organized a conference for security purposes 
over the Mediterranean, the Greek Cypriot side did not attend because the meeting 
seemed to be giving Turkey the chance to pursue interests over the islands for the first 
time since the singing of the Treaty of Lausanne127. Seeing that the meeting was not 
able to give a solution to the dispute, the Turkish government incited turmoil in 
Istanbul on the 6th and 7th of September 1955, the so-called Septemvriana, resulting in 
thousands of Greeks abandoning Turkey128.  
Greek Cypriots were fighting for the enosis and were not satisfied with 
anything less than that. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots supported a possible 
partition of Cyprus between the two countries. The British authorities were struggling 
to find a common ground between the two sides and settle the issue. In February 
1959, Greece, Turkey and Britain met in London to finally agree upon the sovereignty 
of Cyprus. August 16, 1960 marked the creation of the Republic of Cyprus129. 
Archbishop Makarios, who was serving as the first president of Cyprus, proposed in 
November 1963 thirteen constitutional amendments without having the assent of 
Greece. As it was expected, Fazıl Küçük and Rauf Denktaş immediately turned down 
the amendments laying the foundation for a proximate Turkish military intervention in 
Cyprus. 
The conflict between Athens and Ankara was deteriorated when George 
Papandreou was elected as Prime Minister of Greece in February 1964. From the 
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beginning, he backed Makarios and saw enosis as the only way to end the Cyprus 
dispute. Three decades of good terms among Turkey and Greece were now over130.  
 
 
2.6 Turkey & World War II  
 
 
World War I had terrible results for the Ottoman Empire and the aftermath 
determined its attitude for years. This failure constituted a lesson for Turkey, a lesson 
that affected its policies. Turkey’s leaders understood war as a mainly European 
imperialist conflict. When World War II broke out, Turkey chose to adopt an ‘active 
neutral’ foreign policy, according to an influential 1989 book by Selim Deringil. This 
policy was characterized by realism and an attempt towards the avoidance of the 
negative consequences of a war. Every diplomatic method available was used in the 
hopes of not getting involved in trouble but in the end this stance changed due to 
conflicting interests. The Allied Powers insisted that Turkey should also take part 
towards the end of the war. Ankara could not refuse because of the advantageous 
position it could gain at the post-war era131.  
Soviet Union was also a big threat to the Republic of Turkey, influencing its way 
of reacting to the international affairs. Ankara’s diplomatic strategies between 1939 
and 1945 were actually shaped by the consistent fear of Soviet Russia along with the 
Nazi encirclement132. Germany orchestrated an anti-Soviet propaganda in Turkey in 
order to erase all displeasing considerations about an Anglo-Soviet coalition against it. 
The Third Reich was, in fact, interested in supporting Turkey so as to be seen as a 
protector of the Near East. Ankara’s and Berlin’s connection slowly started being more 
and more powerful thanks to economic and ideological reasons. However, 
Russophobia was at the heart of the foreign policy of Turkey long after 1945. If Ankara 
decided to enter the war, the only safe way to do it was by aligning itself to the United 
Nations as soon as possible. After the end of World War II, the rupture in the Soviet-
Turkish relationship was so great that it was impossible to be fixed.  
On the 23rd of February 1945, Turkey declared war against the powers of Axis. 
These were the final days of the war and it was obvious that the Nazi threat had 
moved away. According to the Yalta Conference, Turkey had to symbolically declare 
war as a precondition to join the United Nations. Some of the most prominent scholars 
that specialize on Turkey’s foreign policy doubt that Turkey successfully capitalized on 
World War II by maintaining trade relations with both belligerent blocs, as it falls at 
odds with the country’s sombre economic outlook on the eve of the Yalta 
Conference133. 
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It is important to emphasize on Turkey’s success in balancing between the two 
sides of World War II and keeping neutral relations as regards the global conflict. The 
young Republic maintained a versatile diplomacy that managed to persuade Germany 
to offer support by means of military equipment. Despite the pressure of the Allied 
Powers, Ankara at first avoided entering the war under the pretext of arsenal 
shortage134. It is safe to say that Turkey's only interest at that time was focused on 
maintaining its sovereignty and independence. Turkish foreign policy aimed at survival 
and, maybe, at the strengthening of its relations with the surrounding states. Its 
international position had to be stable and strong in order to secure itself against 
various exterior risks.  
The new Turkey did not have the same attitude with the Ottoman Empire and 
its economic and juridical spheres were not open to penetration. Atatürk wanted the 
young Turkey to be independent and protective of its territories. This concept was still 
alive in the post-war era and Turkey was peacefully coexisting with its neighboring 
countries, preserving its status quo and supporting peace in its region. In its essence 
the Kemalist state was democratic, or at least strove to establish a democratic state135. 
After the end of the Second World War, Stalin issued an ultimatum in which he 
demanded territories along the Straits altogether with returning of some eastern 
regions, Turkey’s allies, Great Britain and the United States of America, did not react or 
offer any kind of support for a long time136. This is one of the main reasons scholars 
tend to underline that the outcome of neutrality had major drawbacks for Turkey. In 
1947, when the war was over and the situation was almost stable again the state did 
not enjoy the benefits the Allies had promised. Instead of the United Kingdom, it was 
the USA that offered not only financial but also military assistance to Turkey aiming to 
prevent it from approaching USSR. In 1952, NATO welcomed its new member, the 
Republic of Turkey which had now lost its neutrality for good. From that moment on, 
Turkey stays with the West owing this to both geopolitical and historical reasons137. 
It is a fact that Turkey did not officially take part in the Second World War but 
that does not mean the state didn’t suffer from the consequences brought by it. The 
defensive stance it adopted had significant cost. From 1940 to 1945, the GNP growth 
was negative138. Turkey faced economic hardship in almost every sector, causing a 
rather slow growth rate but managed to save its people from suffering and dying. 
There is a notable part of the foreign policy literature which deprecates this neutrality 
during the war. Nonetheless, the diplomatic tactics used here had really successful 
results such as the avoidance of a possible economic breakdown that damaged other 
countries severely139.   
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2.7 Eritme Programı  
 
 
The economic downturn of the islands of Imbros and Tenedos from 1952 to 
1964 was obvious deteriorated the life of their people. However, on the occasion of 
the crisis in Cyprus, the human rights violations reached the level of atrocities with the 
implementation of the plan of dehellenization of the islands, the well-known Eritme 
Programı. On May 27, 1964 the Turkish National Security put the plan in action. This 
policy and its implementation were never officially announced to the islanders because 
it was a clear violation of the Treaty of Lausanne. 
Ultimate purpose of the Turkish authorities was to completely dismantle the 
Greek Orthodox communities of the islands. In order to achieve that, Turkey issued 
three secret decrees intending to deprive the Greek Orthodox Imbriots and Tenediots 
of their properties, expel all indigenous inhabitants of the islands, and settle in these 
very lands new settlers140. Eritme Programı achieved its goal. From a pure Greek 
population that in 1964 still exceeded eight thousands, a few hundred remained, the 
majority of which were elderly. The rest scattered to various places and of course 
many reached Greece. In reality, this particular policy deprived Turkey of a law-abiding 
and prosperous population; it burdened the country financially after spending on the 
maintenance of the settlers and radically altered the image of the islands. 
In detail, what the plan was about to accomplish was: 1) expropriation of 90% 
of the arable lands of Imbros and Tenedos, 2) establishment of settlements and 
villages of Turkish settlers from the depths of Anatolia on the islands, 3) creation of an 
artificial dam with the aim of complete disappearance of the largest olive grove of 
Imbros, the main source of income of the inhabitants of the village Agioi Theodoroi 
and 4) establishment of agricultural prisons in Schinoudi, the largest village of Imbros 
and the transfer to them of convicts from the East, who committed criminal acts 
against the Greek inhabitants, with the tolerance of the Turkish authorities141. 
The infamous Eritme Programı consisted of 27 articles in total142. Among 
others, one of the most unbearable guidelines was the abolition of the teaching of the 
Greek language and the minority education system on the two islands. Greek Orthodox 
islanders were not able to take lessons in their mother tongue any more, affecting 
their education as well as their culture. Greek Orthodox communities were not 
allowed to own real estate except for temples. In execution of this law, all the Greek 
Orthodox schools and community buildings were confiscated. Every old building was 
renovated and new ones were constructed in order for the Turkish culture to be 
imposed on every aspect of everyday life. Last but not least, the suppression of 
smuggling was one of the primary objectives of the policy. The ultimate goal of the 
measures taken towards that direction was the control of trade between Imbros, 
Tenedos and Greece.  
Ten years after the first implementation of the dehellenization strategy the 
Turkish authorities evaluated the outcome and saw that despite its successful course, 
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the Turkish population on the islands had not grown satisfactorily. A shift regarding the 
policy was decided, as new job opportunities for the settlers were being created to 
extend their stay and perhaps make them settle permanently in the expropriated 
Greek properties. The adoption of these additional measures led to the complete 
economic, social and cultural dwindling of the Greek element of Imbros and Tenedos 
and -consequently- to the dramatic reduction of their population. The economy of the 
greek community was disintegrated and Greeks were driven en masse to 
unemployment and misery. Eritme Programı resulted in the thorough eradication of 
6,500 Imbriots and about 2,500 Tenediots from their ancestral homes and their 
dispersal in Greece and almost all over the world. The numbers indicate the actual 
damage caused as 40,000 acres of arable land, 44,000 acres of forest land and 78,000 
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Chapter III: Cyprus Dispute and its influence in the Foreign Policy of 
modern Turkey 
The third chapter of this reasearch will follow how the Cyprus issue was featured 
prominently and even dominated Turkey’s political agenda for more than three 
decades. While the disenssion between Greece and Turkey on what is there to be 
resolved is central to the continuance of the Aegean issues, an indisputable 
determinant in the transformation of these prominently legal issues into lasting 
political problems has been the Cyprus question. In 1964, the ‘friendship’ that was 
cultivated between Greece and Turkey with a lot of effort was interrupted by the 
Cyprus dispute, an issue of vital importance to Greece. Imbros and Tenedos would not 
stay out of the picture, as Turkey immediately turned against the Greeks of the islands 
and as retaliation started a series of atrocities against them.  
 
Since the emergence of the conflict in the mid-1950s, the Turkish foreign policy was 
reactive. Nonetheless, the interest in Cyprus was non-negotiable, as the distance 
between it and the southern coast of mainland Turkey is only 40 miles. The most 
important reason for this interest is the strategic position of Cyprus which intrigued 
Turkey for decades and made enosis with Greece seem prohibitive. In Turkish eyes, if 
Cyprus was ever annexed to Greece the advantage would be huge with the threat 
being obvious in the south as well as in the Aegean. Given its significance for Turkey’s 
political and legal relations on the international stage, this chapter will dwell into the 
Cyprus question with the aim to analyze the changing international perception 
towards what Turkey deems a ‘peace operation on the island’ into an ‘invasion’ and a 
‘secessionist act’143. For a long time, the state seemed to balance among the three 
concepts using them regarding its interest. 
 
3.1 Turkish Retaliation against Imbros and Tenedos  
 
With the excuse that Greek population was mistreating the Muslim habitants of 
western Thrace and Cyprus, Turkish authorities abridged the liberties that the Greeks 
of Imbros, Tenedos and Istanbul were enjoying. A major shift in the educational system 
was integrated in 1964, suspending the teaching of the Greek language from the 
academic year 1964-1965144. All schools of the Greek minority were confiscated. For a 
more detailed view on the profits of Turkey by these confiscations, one can take a 
glimpse on the actual value of the forfeited property of the capital of Imbros, Panagia. 
Just the confiscated buildings of that area amounted 400,000 Turkish Liras145.  
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The deprivation of Greek education was another reason for Greeks to abandon 
Imbros and Tenedos. While in 1961, 221 students were attending the primary school 
of Imbros and only 40 the Turkish counterpart, twelve years later the proportion 
changed quite dramatically. 80 students were attending ortaokul (Ημιγυμνάσιον), 
whereas in 1973 out of 126 students that it had in total, only 7 of them were of Greek 
origin146. The 1964 law about education constituted another infraction of the Treaty of 
Lausanne which stipulated the absolute right of the Greeks to have control over their 
schools and educational system.  
Testimonies coming from the indigenous Greek Orthodox people of Gökçeada 
and Bozcaada evince the establishment of an open agricultural prison (Tarım Açık Ceza 
Evi) with Turkish convicts as the main consideration for a possible abandonment of 
their homeland. As expected the convicts of the agricultural prison committed various 
criminal acts that terrified the residents of the islands and made them flee to save 
their lives and families. Schinoudi (Dereköy), Agridia (Tepeköy), and Agioi Theodoroi 
(Zeytinliköy) were the biggest villages of Imbros regarding population before the 
creation of the prison. The decrease they faced was more than significant147. 
The Turkish government was clearly trying to change the character of the 
islands forever and for that cause did not hesitate to spend big amounts of money. It is 
said that during the decade 1963-1973 more than 100,000,000 Turkish Liras were 
given for land expropriations148.  As late as the mid-1950s, Turkish troops arrived and 
settled on the islands, whilst a constabulary strength of some hundreds of men was 
located near the capital of Imbros, Panagia. Former Greek Orthodox school buildings 
were used as educational centers responsible for the spread of Turkish culture.  
For a more general view over the shrinkage of population of the afflicted 
islands, it is enough to compare the census of the 1920 to that of 1970. Over 9,000 
Greeks were residing in Imbros in 1920, only 2,600 of them remained in 1970. The 
Greeks of Tenedos in 1973 were not more than 1,400. The decrease went on the 
following years, peaking after the Turkish invasion in Cyprus. As long as the relations 
between Athens and Ankara were unstable, the Turkish side used the pattern of 
retaliations against everything that was of importance to Greece.  
 
 
3.1.1 Demographic Shift  
 
 
On July 29, 1964, a memorandum informing the international community on 
the issue of Greek education on Imbros and Tenedos and its abolition was issued. As 
an answer to the request of the Greek government, the 13th General Assembly of 
UNESCO discussed the Greek appeal against the abolition of Greek education and the 
Turkification of Greek minority schools. There was, however, no result due to the firm 
principle of the Western powers to avoid any interference in the Greek-Turkish 
relations, while the exact same attitude was adopted by NATO. The Greek government 
was prepared to appeal to the International Court of Justice but stepped back due to 
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pressure from the Allied Powers. As a result, Turkey continued uninterrupted with its 
policy aiming at the demographic change of the populations of both islands. The 
method of demographic shift and the settlement of Turkish population applied so 
successfully by the Turkish government in 1964-1965 is exactly the same as that 
applied ten years later in northern Cyprus with tragic consequences for Hellenism.  
 
 
3.2 Turkish Invasion of Cyprus  
 
Five days after the coup of July 15, 1974, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus began. 
Ordered by the military junta of Greece and orchestrated by the Cypriot National 
Guard along with the Greek Cypriot paramilitary organization, EOKA-B149. Nikos 
Sampson took over the position of Archbishop Makarios in an attempt to unite Cyprus 
with Greece. On the 20th of July 1974, Turkish forces reached and invaded the island. 
With a truce being declared on July 23, both the military junta of Athens and the coup 
government of Cyprus collapsed150. 
A series of consultations between the two countries took place in Geneva. On 
the 14th of August and while the consultations had failed to lead anywhere, Turkey 
invaded again and captured approximately 36% of the island, displacing 150 thousand 
Cypriots. This number constituted one quarter of the total population o Cyprus. A total 
of three thousand Greek Cypriots were killed. A year later, about 60,000 Turkish 
Cypriots moved from the free southern areas to the Turkish-controlled northern 
areas151. The Turkish invasion of Cyprus ended in the worst possible way, with the 
partition of Cyprus along the UN-monitored Green Line, which still divides Cyprus, and 
the formation of an autonomous Turkish Cypriot administration in the north. In 1983, 
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was declared but Turkey was the only country 
that recognized it152.  
The Turkish invasion of Cyprus could not but affect the Greeks of Imbros and 
Tenedos too, as the last Greeks left Tenedos in 1974-75. More specifically, on the night 
of the Turkish invasion, the Turks evacuated the village of Kastro of Imvros and 
engaged in rape and desecration. At the same time, five Greeks were killed in the 
villages of Agioi Theodoroi, Schinoudi, Panagia and Glyky. As a result of all this, in the 
early 1990s, 300 Greeks and 7,200 Turks lived in Imvros, while in Tenedos, the Greek 
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3.3 Cyprus after 1974 
 
Makarios returned to Cyprus on December 7, 1974 and was welcomed with 
great enthusiasm by the people. Being obviously emotional, with the speech he 
addressed to the people, he tried to stimulate the morale of the Cypriots and sent the 
message that the battle was not over and the claim of justice would continue. On his 
return, Makarios found Cyprus divided, as 37% of its territory was now under Turkish 
occupation. The Turkish Cypriots had moved to the northern part of the island and the 
Greek Cypriots to the south. Political life in the Republic of Cyprus had changed once 
and for all, with the two communities undergoing national secession for the first time 
in history154.  
Makarios continued to dominate the political arena of the island until his death 
on August 3, 1977. Spyros Achilleos Kyprianou served as the second President of 
Cyprus from 1977 to 1988, winning the elections unopposed. In the presidential 
elections of 1988, George Vassiliou was elected president with the support of the 
Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL) with 53.6% of the votes. The United 
Nations resolutions and the Makarios-Denktaş and Kyprianou-Denktaş High Level 
Agreements of 1977 and 1979, respectively, contributed to the search for a solution 
after 1974. In order to resolve the Cyprus issue, these agreements provided some 
guidelines that set out the following: 
1. creation of an independent and non-aligned, bi-communal and bi-zonal 
federation. 
2. the right for each community to govern on its own territory, defined on the 
basis of economic viability. 
3. the bi-communal system of government was in charge of issues of principle, 
such as freedom of movement and freedom of establishment. 
4. the powers of the federal government had to ensure the unity of the state, 
respecting its bi-communal character. 
5. assurance of adequate guarantees for the independence and territorial 
integrity of the state against total or partial union with another country, or any 
form of division or secession155. 
 
 
3.4 The Aegean Crisis and its consequences in Greek-Turkish relations 
 
As expected, after the invasion of Cyprus, Turkey intensified its pressure in the 
Aegean and forced Greece to face problems related to its security. Ankara 
encountered the situation as a huge chance to claim a shift regarding the status quo of 
the Aegean and to demand a possible co-management of the sea. Athens tried to 
fortify its islands in the Aegean, especially those closest to the Turkish coast, in order 
to remain as safe as possible. Turkey saw this move as a violation of the Treaties of 
Lausanne and Paris, which provide for the demilitarization of these islands. Greece has 
challenged the continuing validity of these arrangements under the Montreux 
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Convention (1936), arguing that a sovereign state could not waive its right to self-
defense. The main supporter of the demilitarization regime was the Soviet Union. 
The most important issues that concerned both sides were the coastal zone 
and the continental shelf of the Aegean. Turkey considered the possible extension of 
the coastal zone of Greece from 6 to 12 miles as a cause of war. Intransigence on these 
issues was, of course, reinforced by both the US and the USSR. At the same time, the 
Greek side strongly argued that the islands have a continental shelf (Geneva 
Convention 1958) and because there is unity between the mainland and island 
territories of the country, it is not possible for the islands to be trapped by the Turkish 
continental shelf. Of course, all this was in stark contrast to Ankara, which believed 
that the balances brought about by the Treaty of Lausanne would be upset156. 
It quickly became apparent that Ankara did not intend to consent to a possible 
judicial settlement of the disputes that existed, instead strived for the matter to not 
reach the International Court of Justice. The dispute over the Aegean was intense and 
constantly rekindled because of the clear hope of finding oil underground. These 
oilfields would secure the countries in terms of energy and offer them a whole new 
dynamic. Every move by the Turkish side made it clear that its ultimate goal to 
question Greek sovereignty over the islands of the eastern Aegean and the 
Dodecanese in the near future. In 1975 and 1976 a Turkish research-seismological ship 
sailed in the Aegean and violated the Greek continental shelf. The Greek government 
of Konstantinos Karamanlis avoided hostilities and appealed to both the International 
Court of Justice in Hague (ICJ) and the UN Security Council. Nevertheless, the 
diplomatic route did not yield substantial solutions. In 1978, the ICJ announced that it 
could not adjudicate the unilateral Greek appeal.  
It was in March 1978 that the climate seemed to start changing, when 
Konstantinos Karamanlis's meeting with Bülent Ecevit in Montreux adopted the 
principle of bilateral dialogue. Since then, the dialogue between Greece and Turkey 
has taken an official form157. From July 1978 to the end of 1980, regular meetings were 
scheduled between the secretaries-general of the two countries' foreign ministries 
with the aim of examining the possibility of a general agreement with the addition of a 
non-aggression pact. Although the result of the meetings was not the desired one, the 
important thing was that a bridge of communication was maintained between Ankara 




3.5 Greece, NATO and the US 
 
After the fall of the dictatorship, Greece began to pursue a pro-American policy 
with tendencies of detoxification. According to the strategy that the government of 
Kostantinos Karmanlis was following, a possible inclusion in the Western sphere of 
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influence was the right choice. A possible move away from the West would cut the 
country off from the European community and lead to its isolation, multiplying 
Turkey's power to its detriment. Greece's main goal remained to ensure its territorial 
integrity. The withdrawal from the NATO military wing was not only a reaction to the 
Turkish invasion of Cyprus but also a means of satisfying the Greek claims. As a result, 
this move did not seem to have helped Greece much. Turkey vetoed Greece's 
reintegration into NATO, pushing for the redistribution of operational control zones in 
the Aegean. Eventually, Greece returned to NATO after lengthy negotiations in 
October 1980159. 
Greece’s relations with the US were influenced by the US – Turkish relations. 
US's unwillingness to put pressure on Turkey to change its positions on the Aegean and 
the Cyprus issue greatly displeased Greece. Congress passed the embargo in February 
1975, despite objections from Ford and Kissinger, but in April 1978 the Carter 
government lifted it. On March 26, 1976 a US-Turkish bilateral agreement was signed. 
Following a series of reactions and compromises, a 7 to 10 correlation was established 
in the provision of military assistance to Greece and Turkey respectively. The only goal 
was to ensure peace in the Aegean.  
There was a clear connection between the aforementioned issues and the 
redefinition of the status of US bases in Greece. Greece wanted them to be subjects to 
its national control but a little later the country’s return to NATO overshadowed this 
issue160. After 1980 the negotiations for the bases continued but the divergence of the 
two sides was great and unbridgeable. The conflict with Turkey gradually created the 
perception that Greek national interests are not identical with both the American and 
the Allied interests and that Greece had to seek support in other political and 
geographic areas. Towards the end of the decade, Greece approached the countries of 
the Third World and the Eastern Bloc in order to take advantage of the conditions 
created by the international situation161. 
During the first period of the government of PASOK (1981-89), Greek-American 
relations remained close. The socialist government was critical of the crash of the 
South Korean Boeing 747 and the crisis in Poland. In April 1986, when the United 
States bombed Libya, the Greek government claimed that in order for the US to 
stabilize its hegemonic presence in the region, they had destroyed the independence 
of a nation. 
The most important bilateral problem was the renewal of the status of 
American bases in Greece with an international agreement, which would replace the 
previous ones that expired in 1983. While at first the Greek side hinted that there 
would be no renewal, efforts were finally made to win the greatest possible benefits 
through a renewal. The agreement on defense and economic cooperation was signed 
on September 10, 1983, containing a clause for the bases to remain in Greece for at 
least five years. This limited the United States and its rights to the bases, extending 
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Greek jurisdiction. Finally, Greece received the US promise to provide military 
assistance when necessary162. 
The tensions were a consequence of the Greek-Turkish conflict. Both the 
governments of New Democracy and PASOK tried in vain to obtain guarantees from 
the United States and NATO regarding the territorial integrity of Greece and the 
sovereignty of the Aegean. In fact, the US refusal to take a stand reflected their 
unwillingness to oppose to Turkey. While Greece was trying to claim its will on a legal 
basis, the US considered these issues political and not legal and therefore wanted to 
resolve them through negotiations. Of course, Turkey agreed to that.  
From 1985 onwards, Greek-American relations improved significantly. 
However, new negotiations on the bases took place in 1987-88, but did not reach an 
agreement. The Greek parliament due to the elections of the period 1989-90 extended 
their retention until November 1990163. 
 
 
3.6 Events between 1980 and 1989  
 
 
At the October 1981 national elections, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement 
(PASOK) won a landslide victory and things changed drastically as Greece maintained a 
different stance towards Turkey. The government of PASOK prevented any form of 
dialogue with Turkey and searched for a solution, addressing straight the ICJ. Andreas 
Papandreou strongly believed that the only way for the two sides to have better 
relations was the withdrawal of the Turkish occupation troops from Cyprus. In 
November 1983, the unilateral proclamation of the "Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus" was to completely disrupt relations between the two countries.  
The Turkish military regime of Kenan Evren reviewed Turkey's relations with 
the Islamic world with the aim of becoming a regulator of relations and events in the 
region. An exponent of the new dynamics shown by Turkey was Turgut Özal, perhaps 
the most important political figure of this decade. On the 20th of May 1983, he 
founded the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi) and became its leader. His party won 
the elections and he formed the government to become the 19th Prime minister of 
Turkey .  
Between 1983 and 1987 hostility in relations between Greece and Turkey was 
expressed in various ways. In 1984, Greece submitted to NATO the list of forces it 
offers to the alliance and included units of army and air force stationed on the island of 
Lemnos. This was strongly opposed by Turkey, which, citing the Lausanne treaty, 
stressed that Greece's position causes its violation since it rejects the demilitarization 
of the island. Bernard William Rodgers, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, 
suggested that Lemnos should join the American plan to strengthen the forces on the 
Thracian front in time of war. As expected, this provoked the Turkish rage, which was 
also expressed through the press. 
In March 1987, Turkey and Greece reached the brink of war. A possible clash 
between NATO members, of course, immediately attracted American interest. The 
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catastrophic war between the two countries was avoided in the context of the general 
mood of Turkey to show a better profile with a view to its future entry into the 
European Economic Community (EEC). On the initiative of Andreas Papandreou, a 
substantial effort was launched to approach Turgut Özal . Following a series of letters 
between the two leaders, they finally met in February 1988 in Davos, Switzerland. 
During this meeting it was agreed to assign the resolution of the disputes of the two 
countries to two special committees, without discussing the issues of the Aegean 
continental shelf and the removal of the Turkish troops from Cyprus. Already in April 
1988, the situation started deteriorating again because the two sides had obvious 
conflicting interests. Ankara expressed its concerns about the fate of the Turkish 
minority of Thrace, while Athens was not willing to assist in the reheating of Turkey - 
EEC relations as long as Turkish troops were still in Cyprus .  
The scandals that erupted in the two countries in November and December 
1988 diverted the interest of their leaders from finding a modus vivendi in order to 
settle their disputes peacefully. 
 
 
3.7 The issue of Demilitarization 
 
From 1974 onwards, Turkey insisted on the alleged Greek violations of 
international agreements such as the Peace Treaties of Lausanne (1923) and Paris, 
regarding the obligation to demilitarize the eastern Aegean islands. This invocation of 
violations has three objectives: first, to question the legitimacy of the Aegean data and 
to undermine stability, second, to create an impression to the international public that 
Greece is illegal and third, to achieve the revision of the existing international regime 
in the Aegean164. 
Demilitarization is a regime of international law which arises as a result of a 
bilateral or multilateral treaty, to which one or more states commit themselves, in 
order not to fortify, deploy or send troops, to establish foreign military bases in certain 
areas of their territory, usually borders or islands. The purpose of demilitarization is to 
prevent armed conflict in cases of border incidents and other crises between 
neighboring countries, as well as to avoid unpredictable attacks. 
In the Aegean, the regime of demilitarization of the Greek islands is not 
uniform but is defined by three different legal regimes for each category of islands. 
According to Turkey, the islands of Lemnos and Samothrace are governed by the 
Lausanne Convention on the Straits (1923), while in Greece by the Montreux 
Convention (1936), which replaced the previous agreement in whole or in part. Then, 
the islands of Mytilene, Chios, Samos and Ikaria belong to the Peace Treaty of 
Lausanne (1923). Finally, the Dodecanese is governed by the Treaty of Paris (1946). 
Greece has deployed military forces on all these islands, an action that Turkey 
considers illegal and a violation of Greece's commitments stemming from international 
treaties. However, some Aegean islands were not demilitarized, such as Thassos, 
Psara, Agios Efstratios and some islets. Turkey accepts that these three islands are 
Greek even if they are not mentioned in the Lausanne Treaty because they have been 
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under Greek occupation since 1914. The Turkish state itself, at the Lausanne Peace 
Conference, has accepted Greek sovereignty over these islands but on the condition 
that they will not be fortified165.  
 
3.7.1 Imia: A military crisis  
 
Changes on the international stage after 1989 could not but affect Greek-
Turkish relations. On the one hand, Turkey's geopolitical position was being upgraded, 
and on the other hand, the Mitsotakis government was trying to open a dialogue 
aiming at Greek-Turkish communication and, in the long run, at the improvement of 
the situation. The frictions between the two countries were many. On the 8th of June 
1995 the dispute escalated as the Turkish parliament gave the government the 
freedom to take any decision it considered right - even a declaration of war - in 
response to Greece's desire to increase its territorial waters from 6 to 12 miles. 
A continuation of the crisis that began in the Aegean Sea in the early 1970s is 
the crisis that broke out in the Southeast Aegean between Greece and Turkey due to 
two tiny islands in the Dodecanese archipelago, known as Imia. On December 25, 
1995, the Turkish merchant ship Figen Akat ran aground in the waters of one of the 
two rocky islets east of Kalymnos. Until then, to the majority of the Turkish and Greek 
people, Imia was unknown. After a telephone consultation, the towing of the Turkish 
merchant was carried out with a Greek tug. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 
December 29, 1995 claimed for the first time that the Imia islets are Turkish, 
automatically provoking a strong reaction from Athens, as for the first time a land - 
part of the Greek territory was questioned. 
Ankara directly challenged the 1932 Protocol between Italy and Turkey on the 
border demarcation, arguing that it was drafted under certain conditions on the eve of 
World War II and had not been formally submitted to the League of Nations for 
ratification. Greece's response was that the Imia islets are part of the Dodecanese that 
were ceded to Greece along with all the Dodecanese by the Italians under the 1947 
Peace Treaty. 
A few days later, on January 25, 1996, the mayor of Kalymnos and three of his 
fellow citizens raised the Greek flag on one of the rocky islets of Imia. Two days later, a 
crew of the Turkish newspaper Hürriyet landed on this rocky islet, hoisted the Greek 
flag and raised the Turkish flag in its place, which provoked a strong reaction from 
Greece. The Greek side soon decided to change the flag with the help of a Greek 
military patrol166. 
This happened at the most inappropriate moment for both countries. The 
Greek government of Costas Simitis and the interim government of Tansu Çiller had 
just taken the reins. Simitis spoke of "aggressive nationalism" from Turkey and Çiller 
stated that "not a single stone will be given to the Greeks from the turkish homeland". 
After the raising of the flag by the Greek military patrol, an event that raised the 
tensions more, the situation was now out of control. The Greek fleet lined up in the 
Eastern Aegean, and then the Turkish fleet did exactly the same by order of Çiller to 
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the commander of the Turkish Navy, Admiral Güven Erkaya. The crisis escalated mainly 
due to the restraint shown by Simitis. Tansu Çiller used the escalation to secure the 
position of prime minister against Mesut Yılmaz, who eventually succeeded her as 
prime minister shortly after the crisis. 
The US, and especially the Minister of Defense William Perry, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Warren Christopher, and President Bill Clinton himself have played a 
key role in the de-escalation. From the Turkish side, many officials admitted that Tansu 
Çiller handled the situation in this way for selfish political purposes. Her successor, 
Mesut Yılmaz, spoke to the Turkish National Assembly about the irresponsible attitude 
of his predecessor and the Foreign Ministry bureaucrats. The same position was 
supported by the leader of the opposition, Islamist, Necmettin Erbakan. General İsmail 
Hakkı Karadayı referred to a "strategic mistake from Turkey" and Deputy Foreign 
Minister İnan Batu spoke of demagoguery and blamed the press. The crisis in Imia, 
however, has the effect of adding another issue to the Greek-Turkish agenda for the 
Aegean, referred to as "gray zones"167. 
 
3.8 Aegean Dispute over the years   
 
The escalation of the revising Turkish foreign policy at the transnational level, 
but also the intensification of the technological upgrade of Turkey's weapon systems 
and the use of the Turkish Armed Forces for the practical application of the particular 
interpretation of international law constitutes an investigative object. Turkish 
politicians were always aware of the basic principle of International Law that it is the 
duty of each state to respect the territorial integrity of other states, a right enshrined 
in the Charter of the United Nations, of which Turkey is a founding member. However, 
Turkish foreign policy promotes the violation of territorial integrity by perpetuating the 
issue of nautical miles and airspace. 
Turkey has, in fact, threatened to use military force, an action legally prohibited 
by the International Court of Justice. More specifically, the message of the Turkish 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, to the Prime Minister of Greece, 
Konstantinos Karamanlis, in 1979, is characteristic. He stated, “It has often been said 
that if Greece attempts to extend its territorial sea to twelve miles, Turkey will consider 
this act as a cause of war. Greece should not risk such a thing." This statement, like 
other similar statements made by Turkish representatives in previous and subsequent 
periods, has always been aimed at influencing public opinion and reviving nationalist 
sentiments inside and outside Turkey and distracting the Turkish people from critical 
internal problems that need to be dealt with168. 
The dialogue between Greece and Turkey has gone through various stages and 
refers to the clarification of the Greek-Turkish issues that have been raised unilaterally 
by Ankara regarding the maritime space of the Aegean Archipelago and which create 
problems of security, cohesion and strategy in the southeastern wing of NATO. 
According to the Greek side, these problems do not actually exist. The outcome of the 
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long-term negotiations for the settlement of the Cyprus Issue will be catalytic and 
directly dependent on the smooth conduct of discussions169. 
In 2018, the head of the Turkish Armed Forces, Hulusi Akar, in his statements 
after the Efes exercise, once again expressed Turkey's strategic interest in the Aegean 
Sea and Cyprus, "Every effort is made to make the Aegean a sea of peace, friendship 
and cooperation. At the same time, our Turkish armed forces, which resolutely protect 
in all our seas the rights and interests of our country and our people stemming from 
international law and agreements, will never allow the creation of perpetrators. The 
Turkish Armed Forces will continue to protect the rights and interests of Turkey and the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean and to ensure peace 
and security based on the international conditions of guarantees and alliance in 
Cyprus."170 
Turkish aggression against Greece and Cyprus, in addition to its constant usual 
manifestation, is also recorded though various other ways. Greece and Cyprus are 
accepting, with increasing intensity from 2015-2016, when the great migration crisis in 
the periphery of Europe manifested itself, an ever-escalating hybrid war. This situation 
cannot be typologically defined as a normal war, but it is also not identical with the 
normal perception of peace between two states. Turkish foreign policy in this context 
consists of a peculiar approach to international law at will, constant psychological 
pressure and military actions which are controlled, but do not cease to be a direct 
military confrontation. At the moment, Turkey is highly revisionist and ambitious, with 
the major strategic goal of projecting power in areas that were once Ottoman 
territories, from Syria and Iraq to Libya171. 
According to the Professor Cengiz Aktar, Turkish foreign policy does not really 
have the means to effectively implement its ambitions, although the situation has 
tended to change in recent years. For decades, specifically from 1923 to 2005, Turkey 
was practically cut off from neighboring countries in terms of normal bilateral and 
regional diplomatic relations, as it did not have a structured foreign policy or a fully 
autonomous diplomatic corps. For decades, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
consisted of about 1,200 unskilled diplomats without subject matter expertise. In the 
midst of the AKP's political domination and the rise of Erdoğan's authoritarian regime, 
Turkey's foreign policy is moving incoherently and indefinitely in all directions172. 
2017 was a record year in terms of violations and provocative statements by 
Turkey about the Aegean. The number of violations was unprecedented as it reached 
almost 3,000 violations in the air and 1,700 at sea173. Combining the escalating hybrid 
war, Turkey's violations and challenges with Erdoğan's victory in the June 24, 2018 
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elections, Turkey continues its offensive program in the region in the following years, 
claiming the role of absolute regional power174. In its quest to become a strong 
regional power, Turkey has focused on developing technological infrastructure and 
knowledge that will lead the country to build a strong defense industry, so that in the 
future it will be independent and autonomous in terms of its equipment.  
The Turkish attempt at autonomy in terms of defense equipment dates back to 
the 1970s and was prompted by the US arms embargo on Turkey after the invasion of 
Cyprus. Turkey's continuous policy on this issue has contributed to the development 
and gradual institutional improvement of the Turkish defense industry for thirty years. 
As a result of the above developments, Turkey has gained institutional experience and 
military construction know-how, moving on to the designing of its own weapon 




3.9 Turkish Officials’ Views 
 
In any approach to Turkish foreign policy, the analysis of the country's role in 
international relations automatically underscores the importance of geopolitical 
factors. Many of the problems that Turkey is facing today have to do with its 
geographical location. Relations with the European Union, Cyprus and especially the 
dispute over the Aegean, as well as other problems with Greece continue to be of 
paramount importance for Turkey, a country at the crossroads of areas of high 
strategic intensity. On the part of Turkey in the open dispute over sovereignty in the 
Aegean or Cyprus, a completely aggressive nationalist approach would result in the 
complete alienation of Turkey from the West and would affect Ankara's vital 
institutional and bilateral ties with Europe and the United States176. 
The Kemalist quote "Yurtta sulh, cihanda sulh" (Peace at home, Peace in the 
world) has in the past promoted a realistic foreign policy stance that took into account 
the international situation in which colonialism culminated and demonstrated the 
desire for no conflict with the colonies177. Turkey should intend to maintain its 
statehood and peace at the upper end of the central Islam crescent, but also to 
promote its internal prosperity.  
In the form of an overview, we quote in chronological order the statements of 
the Turkish side in order to understand how, regardless of political affiliation and 
secularism, the Turks officially made statements of a nationalist nature, accompanied 
by events that prove the rebirth of the Turkish expansion. 
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“Turkey's future lies at sea. Turkey is obliged to become a Mediterranean 
nation. All politicians have accepted this line for the future of Turkey”, İlhami Sancar 
(Minister of National Defense) January 10, 1974 
 
“Turkey and Greece appreciate the value of their peaceful coexistence. The 
dispute stems from the fact that the islands near Turkey belong to Greece and not to 
Turkey. These islands are part of Anatolia and for centuries belonged to the state that 
dominated Anatolia”, Süleyman Demirel (Leader of the Opposition) June 9, 1974 
 
“Defense of the Aegean islands should be undertaken jointly by Greece and 
Turkey as allies within NATO”, Bülent Ecevit (Prime Minister of Turkey) July 30, 1974 
 
“I will not cede the Aegean to anyone. Half of the Aegean belongs to us. 
Everyone should know this. We do not intend to innovate on foreign policy issues. If the 
honor and interests of the Turkish nation are attacked, we will crush the head of the 
enemy”, Sadi Irmak (Prime Minister of Turkey) January 18, 1975 
 
“The islands of Lemnos and Lesvos, which are only a few miles from Asia Minor 
and for centuries were the capitals of Turkish provinces, are areas necessary to us, not 
only as part of the Ottoman state's heritage, but also for our security. We want these 
islands which are unjustly occupied by the Greeks”, Milliyet (Turkish Newspaper) 
February 3, 1982 
 
“Any action by Greece to extend its territorial sea to 12 nautical miles will be 
considered by Turkey as a cause of war”, Turgut Özal (Prime Minister of Turkey) 
November 30, 1983 
 
“It is reasonable that the rights and responsibilities of a nation, which is 
sovereign of Anatolia, should extend to at least half of the Aegean. No Turkish 
government can ignore this fact, which is a matter of national security”, Hasan Işık 
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3.10 Birth of Hope for the islands  
 
When the Greeks of both Imbros and Tenedos were forced to abandon the 
islands in the 1960s and 1970s, they were quite unsure if they would ever be able to 
return. The decades of 1970 and 1980 were called “the decades of exile”, as Imbriots 
and Tenediots visited the islands extremely rarely or never. The reasons were various, 
aside from the obvious financial and psychological ones. Turkey defined the islands as 
restricted military zone. A special permit from Çanakkale was obligatory for everyone 
who wanted to reach the region, along with the obligation to surrender their passport 
to the Turkish authorities. Even so, not all of them managed to get the permit to reach 
the islands or to do so, the duration of their visit was very short .  
There was also a common fear between the Greek men who had left the 
islands before completing their military service that if they came back had not yet 
acquired Greek citizenship, there would be a high probability that they would be 
forced by the Turkish authorities to enlist as Turkish citizens . During this period the 
Greek villages of the islands, which used to be full of life, gradually fell into disrepair 
with the remnants of the houses now being gradually destroyed by vandalism, looting 
or even natural causes.  
In an effort not to forget their homeland, the inhabitants of Imbros and 
Tenedos established associations that would play an important role in the structure of 
their society. The famous Imvrian Association was responsible for the continuation of 
all the traditions. As the uprooted islanders so wanted to go back to the rural style of 
life, they were dreaming of establishing a “New Imbros” in Greece. Greeks across the 
globe were known for their famous ideology of “lost homelands”. Their nostalgic 
longing for place was expressed through writings, memories and toponyms at the 
place of their new settlement and later became a main feature of the Greek nationalist 
discourse .   
In 1980s, a rural area in Western Thrace, near the city of Komotini, was ready 
to welcome the islanders and become their “New Imbros”. An area of 400,000 m² was 
hoped to be granted to the Imbriots and Tenediots by the Greek government. The 
association of the expatriated people had already started informing everyone who 
might be interested in settling in the lands of New Imbros . Unfortunately, the 
settlement of the uprooted in Thrace never came to fruition thanks to mostly financial 
reasons. The collapse of the idea for “New Imbros” coincided with the re-emergence of 
“Old Imbros”. 
At the end of this decade, the difficulties for the expatriated inhabitants in 
visiting the islands gradually decreased. Since the 1980s, the Greek government was 
taking actions towards granting citizenship to the Greeks of Turkey in order for them to 
be able to cross the borders, even without having completed their military service. It 
was not until 1993 that Turkey permitted access to the islands and lifted all 
restrictions, turning them into a touristic destination after decades of being a military 
zone. At this point, it is important to underline that the open agricultural prison near 
the village Schinoudi had already ceased to operate . The Davos process of 1988 which 
led to the rapprochement of Greece and Turkey encouraged the Greeks of the islands 
to return to Turkey with increasing frequency during the 1990s.  
104 young returnees of Gökçeada and Bozcaada composed and signed an open 
letter in August 1992, inviting everyone to join them and return to the islands, with the 
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aim of going back to their roots and rebuilding their lives there. The return movement 
started growing rapidly and, within its framework, people tried to restore or even 
rebuild their families’ houses and make them habitable again. According to their 
association, by 2007 only in Agridia a total of 180 houses were rebuilt, at a cost of over 
4 million euros .  
As the century turned, the return movement was becoming bigger and bigger 
and more than 3000 expatriated from all over the world (Australia, North America) 
visited their islands during summer. From the 1990s onwards, the new trend was for 
the older generations to return to the islands semi-permanently, from Easter till 
October of every year. Of course, there was a smaller number of them who chose to 
return and reside on the islands permanently. In 2016, the villages Agridia, Agioi 
Theodoroi, Glyky and Schinoudi gathered the most of the Greek residents . Hope may 
have been lost for the islands a few decades ago, but from 2000 onwards more and 
more Greeks returned permanently or even for holidays, bringing life again mainly to 
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Conclusion 
Imbros and Tenedos inside the chaotic jumble of the Greco-Turkish relations 
 
 
As this research has unfolded, the perplexity of the relations between the 
neighboring countries of Greece and Turkey over time is presented in depth. Both the 
islands of Imbros and Tenedos were right in the middle of an ever-changing situation 
that directly affected them and led to their demographic shrinkage. The famous Greek 
community of the islands experienced unprecedented situations and that is why it 
constitutes a rather particular case, for it is the circumstances that were probably the 
most peculiar and harsh than in any other case.  
Despite their unwillingness to abandon their homelands, the Greeks were 
forced to do so. Their fate was decided by the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, which chose to 
entrust both the formulation and the application of its 14th article solely to Turkey. This 
fact combined with the geographic position of the islands, the chaotic Greek foreign 
policy of that period and its inability to provide the inhabitants with the basic rights, 
proved to have turned Greek Imbriots and Tenediots into victims of an uncontrolled 
situation. In short, there was an obvious motive behind the stance of the Turkish side, 
the Greek sensitivity towards the issue of its minority in Turkey, which was repeatedly 
used to its advantage. The dehellenization of Imbros and Tenedos had a huge impact 
on Greece itself.  
The age-old Greek community of Gökçeada and Bozcaada was violently 
expatriated after persistent efforts on behalf of Turkey. With the tension in the 
relations between Greece and Turkey culminating with the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, 
Greece seemed defeated and weak, incapable of putting an end to such acts of 
violence. Mostly after the 1990s when the political foreground seemed to have 
quietened, Greeks started visiting the islands again and timidly deciding to return 
permanently and start over. This was a demanding procedure but certain steps from 
the Turkish government were taken towards that direction, contributing to the hope 
for a more stable and auspicious future. 
Greek minorities in Turkey, especially those of Istanbul, Imbros and Tenedos, 
have always been an integral part of Hellenism, as it is evidenced by their contribution 
of utmost importance to every aspect of the Greek Identity such language, religion, 





The writer wishes to conclude with the words of the American diplomat and 
poet George Horton, US Consul in Smyrna, during the Asia Minor catastrophe:  
 
“Turkey, a country that for 500 years could not produce any culture other than 
that of the Ottoman Empire, can by no means respect minorities. Besides, it does not 
respect the majority of its own citizens either..." 
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